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ABSTRACT 
The current state of the personal ontology debate can be summarized as a 
disagreement between two roughly distinct camps. First, there are those philosophers who 
argue that personal identity consists of psychological continuity. According to the 
psychological continuity theorist, one‟s identity over time is traced by following a series 
of memories, beliefs, desires, or intentions. Opposed to psychological continuity theories 
are those who argue that personal identity consists of biological continuity. So-called 
“animalists” suggest that our identity corresponds to that of a human organism, a member 
of the species Homo Sapiens. As long as the event of the organism‟s life continues, there 
too do we persist, according to the animalist. It is my contention that both views suffer 
difficulties found when exploring their metaphysical commitments and responses to 
certain widely-discussed thought experiments. In this thesis, I aim to resurrect the ancient 
view of hylomorphism, by which I mean the view espoused by Aristotle and adapted by 
St. Thomas Aquinas that posits matter and form as the basic constituents of every 
material object. As a theory of personal ontology, I argue that hylomorphism has the 
resources to provide a formidable challenge to the two main views. I will offer 
hylomorphic responses to general problems faced by accounts of personal identity such 
as intransitivity, circularity, fission, and composition, and show how its answers are an 
improvement over those given by psychological continuity theory and animalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “problem of personal identity” refers ambiguously to at least two very 
different questions. Historically, arguments have attempted to deal with the issue of 
personhood: what is a “person” and what are the conditions one must satisfy in order to 
achieve that status? Discussions have often been limited to identifying certain 
psychological features that are essential to a person‟s persistence over time. Answers to 
this question frequently rely on an intuitive relevance of the concept of a person in 
framing ethical and political theories. But there is also a more fundamental question for 
the problem of personal identity. Following a distinction made by Judith Jarvis 
Thompson, Eric Olson has recently resurrected the problem of personal ontology.
1
 Olson 
suggests that the ontological question of personal identity is the question of our “most 
basic metaphysical nature.”2 In other words, what are our metaphysical constituents? And 
of the properties that we have, which are essential and which are accidental? Another way 
of posing the question is to ask what we refer to when we use the personal pronoun „I‟. 
Assuming that there is an answer to this question, it will help us determine the category 
of the thing that we are.  
The question of personal ontology is importantly different from the issue of 
personhood. Most notably, defining personhood does not necessarily entail that we or 
anything else fulfills that definition, whereas personal ontology starts by asking what we 
essentially are. As Olson points out, the issue of personhood dogmatically excludes the 
possibility that in investigating our own metaphysical nature we may find that we are not 
essentially persons.
3
 In that regard, the „personal‟ of personal ontology refers to the 
reflexive nature of the question, rather than an emphasis on the ontology of “persons” in 
an achieved sense. 
                                                          
1
 Eric Olson, What are We? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) with reference to Judith Thomson, 
“People and Their Bodies,” in Jonathan Dancy, Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell): 202-230.  
2
 Ibid., 3. 
3
 Olson‟s own biological approach, for example, denies that we are essentially persons. This of course 
depends on one‟s definition of a person. There is an implicit debate between those who advocate a Boethian 
definition of persons as “individual substance[s] of a rational nature” (Boethius, Theological Tractates, 
translated by H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand and S.J. Tester (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973): 
85) and Lockeans who define a person as “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and 
can consider itself as itself” (John Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” in John Perry, 
Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975): 39), but this is not a debate I will be 
entering into here. 
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A related issue involves establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions of our 
persistence over time. There is a long-standing tradition in discussions concerning 
personal identity of using thought experiments to determine these conditions. While these 
may go some way towards answering metaphysical questions of our fundamental nature 
(and the technique is one that I will use throughout my own thesis), it falls short of 
ending all debates. We could agree on established persistence conditions while still 
disagreeing on an ontological account. As Olson states, “[t]o say what our identity 
through time consists in is only to begin to say what sort of thing we are, just as 
describing a country‟s coastline only begins to tell us about its geography.”4 The greater 
question, then, for the problem of personal identity is the question of metaphysical 
categorization for that which we most fundamentally are. Presenting an account that 
appropriately responds to this need is the focus of my thesis.  
From the outset, it might be suggested by detractors that personal ontology is an 
empty or misguided approach. The issue of personhood, it may be argued, is more 
worthwhile due to its obvious relevance for ethics and politics. Personal ontology may 
satisfy a metaphysical curiosity, but it does not seem to accurately trace our concerns. On 
the contrary, I would like to argue, initially, that while there is an element of speculative 
curiosity in the motivations for providing ontological accounts, the identification and 
diachronic mapping of one‟s identity over time can be framed in such a way as to lay the 
foundations for ethical and political theories. Therefore, before I offer an account of 
personal ontology, it may help to address the importance of the project. In the following 
section I will offer a defence of the importance of identity for our philosophical concerns. 
I.1 Defending Identity 
Derek Parfit has famously argued that identity is not what matters to us.
5
 To 
understand the basic motivation for his position it will be necessary to introduce certain 
thought experiments, to which I will add further analysis in later chapters. Imagine that at 
this moment, in your office, room, etc., where there once was a single bearer of your 
psychology (you), there are now two or more replacements, each one psychologically 
                                                          
4
 Olson, What Are We?, 18. 
5
 Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1 (January, 1971): 12; Reasons 
and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 255.   
 3 
identical to you in your previous state. These duplicates would share all of your beliefs, 
desires, memories, and intentions. Because it would be absurd to identify yourself as both 
separately existing individuals,
6
 and neither would be entitled to sole possession of your 
identity,
7
 the thought experiment seems to result in your ceasing to exist. But if, as Parfit 
argues, a single continuation of one‟s psychology would be sufficient for one‟s continued 
existence, “[h]ow could a double success be a failure?”8 The point that Parfit makes in 
including this example is that while you logically cannot continue to exist as identical to 
either of your duplicates, their ability to take on and complete your projects and 
aspirations allows for all that you care about to survive. If what matters to us can continue 
without our being identical to any future recipients of our psychology, Parfit concludes, 
identity cannot concern us as much as we may think.  
Parfit‟s remarks have stirred a lengthy and complex debate among philosophers 
working in personal identity, and while a full treatment of the discussion is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, there are some notable replies worth including for the sake of 
defending the relevance of personal ontology. The most controversial aspect of Parfit‟s 
thesis is his suggestion that the relation one would have to one‟s psychological duplicates 
includes all of the “vital element[s] that [are] contained in ordinary survival.”9 In arguing 
against Parfit, Lynn Rudder Baker states that if psychological continuity were all that we 
cared about, “our ordinary practices of agency and morality would be incoherent”:  
Suppose that A [pre-fission or pre-duplication individual] was a politician 
who vowed to become the first woman Democratic presidential candidate. 
B and C [psychological duplicates or offshoots of A], each of whom 
reports remembering A‟s vow, are both infuriated by the expected (and 
unfair?) competition. Suppose that B becomes the first woman Democratic 
presidential candidate. B says, elatedly, „Since I am the first woman 
Democratic presidential candidate, I‟ve totally fulfilled the intention that I 
remember before the operation.‟ A says dejectedly, „Since I am not the 
first woman Democratic presidential candidate, the intention that I 
remember before the operation is totally unfulfillable.‟ How can a single 
intention both be totally fulfilled and totally unfulfillable? Our practices of 
                                                          
6
 See section 1.2.1 below. 
7
 In other words, there is no “closest-continuer.” See sections 1.2.1-1.2.3 below for further discussion of 
fission and closest continuer theories. 
8
 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 256. 
9
 Ibid., 261. 
 4 
apologizing, promise keeping, and intending become incoherent if we 
suppose that our interest in identity really is interest only in psychological 
continuity.10 
Making a similar point, Patrick Lee and Robert George argue that psychological 
duplication without identity would fail to preserve our sense of autonomy: 
If B learns that the memories he has are actually results of transfer or 
transplant from A‟s brain and actual life, he will rightly feel that his 
autonomy has been violated. The plans and commitments he thought were 
his, that is, of his own making, he discovers are actually the product of 
someone else‟s (A‟s) choices. They would no more be his plans and 
commitments than if he had been induced to have them through 
hypnosis.11 
The main problem with Parfit‟s suggestion that identity does not matter to us is, I 
think, his neglect of what Peter Unger calls our “singular goods.”12 According to Unger, 
there are certain things one treasures that are singular in nature and cannot be done for the 
same benefit by someone else. Most of these singular goods are one‟s relationships with 
other people. It is of crucial importance to me, says Unger, that I continue to enjoy the 
particular company of my wife that results from our unique relationship, and not that 
certain psychological duplicates enjoy that company. The relationship is special in virtue 
of the fact that she (my wife) has it with no other man. A “double success” involving two 
duplicates of myself would likely result in the failure of our marriage due to my wife‟s 
struggles to carry on that relationship with two men simultaneously. Even if one were to 
solely consider the benefits of duplication for the duplicates, only one of my offshoots 
could have that unique relationship to my wife and the others would find themselves 
frustrated and forlorn. On average, the lives of the duplicates would be much less 
preferable than my own survival.  
David Hershenov has also expanded the singular goods intuition to a 
consideration of one‟s children: 
when contemplating one‟s young son or daughter splitting… concern for 
the well being of offspring is more clearly dependent upon their identity 
being preserved than their psychology continuing. We don‟t come to love 
                                                          
10
 Lynn Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 129. 
11
 Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008): 37 
12
 Peter Unger, Identity, Consciousness and Value (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990): 275-276. 
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our children in virtue of their psychology and we would continue to show 
that same great concern if they underwent radical psychological 
discontinuity. But if they cease to exist via fission, our concern won‟t 
transfer undiminished to their successors.13  
Consequently, it seems that any relation we may have to future individuals or any 
relation future individuals may have to us that is less than full numerical identity will be 
lacking in some significant sense. It is a matter of personal concern to us whether or not 
we, ourselves, persist through time and for that reason it is worth considering what our 
identity consists in, or to echo Olson, what we are.  
Admittedly, the arguments above rely largely on the reader‟s response to the 
thought experiments and basic ideas of prudential concern. I leave the possibility of 
defending Parfit‟s thesis open to debate, but my suggestion is that we may have reason to 
consider personal ontology as more than a practice of speculative metaphysics for at least 
the reasons outlined above. The actual ethical, political, or religious implications for my 
own position in the personal ontology debate are not explored in this thesis. I ask the 
reader to keep in mind, however, that the importance of identity can only be denied by 
forsaking these seemingly entrenched intuitions. 
With that said, there are other motivations than prudential concern for pursuing an 
account of personal ontology, some of which will be analyzed in more detail in later 
sections. Olson, for example, has resurrected the issue in order to solve metaphysical and 
epistemological conundrums related to his “thinking animal problem.”14 Peter van 
Inwagen is interested in personal ontology as part of a greater discussion of problems of 
composition.
15
 And the works of some personal identity theorists, such as Hud Hudson 
and David Lewis, set out to explain a universal metaphysics of temporal parts.
16
 There 
                                                          
13
 David Hershenov, “Soulless Organisms? Hylomorphism vs. Animalism,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly (Forthcoming); Hershenov makes similar remarks in “Identity Matters,” in Neil A. 
Manson and Robert Barnard, The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, (Forthcoming). 
14
 Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997); What are We? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), “An Argument for Animalism,” 
in Raymond Martin and John Barresi, eds., Personal Identity (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003): 
318-334. The problem will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
15
 Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
16
 Hud Hudson, A Material Metaphysic of Human Persons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); 
David Lewis, “Survival and Identity,” in Raymond Martin and John Barresi, Personal Identity (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003): 144-167. 
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are also recent discussions outlining religious conceptions of survival after death using 
positions found in the personal ontology literature.
17
 Once again, my focus is not to 
outline a particular motivation for answering the question of personal ontology, but rather 
to indicate (contra Parfit) that any view concerning identity of one‟s self over time can 
have meaningful and wide-reaching repercussions. It is with that in mind that I begin a 
presentation of my own strategy.  
I.2 Hylomorphism and What it Can Provide 
The current state of the personal ontology debate can be summarized as a 
disagreement between two roughly distinct camps.
18
 First, there are those philosophers 
who argue that personal identity consists of psychological continuity. Diachronically, 
according to the psychological continuity theorist, one‟s identity over time is traced by 
following a series of memories, beliefs, desires, or intentions. Synchronically, in 
answering the question of what we most fundamentally are, the psychological continuity 
theorist is a little less clear. It could be that one is a functional state of a certain kind,
19
 or 
a bundle of memories, beliefs or desires,
20
 or, simply put, a person, understood as “a 
materially coincidental entity with certain unique persistence conditions.”21 Opposed to 
psychological continuity theories are those who argue that personal identity consists of 
                                                          
17
 See, for example, Peter van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” International Journal of 
Philosophy of Religion, Vol. IX, No. 2 (1978): 114-121; Dean Zimmerman, “The Compatibility of 
Materialism and Survival: „The Falling Elevator‟Model,” Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April 
1999): 194-212; Eleonore Stump, “Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul,” in 
Bruno Niederberger and Edmund Runggaldier, Die menschliche Seele: Brauchen wir den Dualismus? The 
Human Soul: Do We Need Dualism? (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006): 151-172; Trenton Merricks, “How to 
Live Forever without Saving Your Soul,” in Kevin Corcoran, Soul, Body, and Survival (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2001): 183-200; David Hershenov, “Van Inwagen, Zimmerman and the Materialist 
Conception of Resurrection,” Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. 
38, (December 2002): 451-469. 
18
 As will become clear by the end of my investigation, these two categories are sometimes only 
approximate. There are views that borrow from both camps, and some that borrow from neither. 
19
 This could in turn mean that we are certain three-dimensional, functioning parts of an organism, or we 
are a series of temporal parts of an organism including only those moments of functionality. The hypothesis 
that we are proper parts of organisms will be addressed in section 2.2.2. I will not, however, be discussing 
in detail any four-dimensionalist theories of personal identity. I leave that analysis for another work.   
20
 This was Hume‟s view. See David Hume, “Of Personal Identity,” in John Perry, Personal Identity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975): 162. 
21
 This definition most directly corresponds to Lynn Rudder Baker‟s constitutionalism (see Persons and 
Bodies). I will not be explicitly discussing Baker‟s view here, though many of my objections to 
psychological continuity in general should apply to her position, as will Olson‟s thinking animal problem. 
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biological continuity. So-called “animalists” suggest that our identity corresponds to that 
of a human organism, a member of the species Homo Sapiens. As long as the event of the 
organism‟s life continues, so too do we persist, according to the animalist.  
These two positions, psychological continuity theory (PCT) and animalism are at 
odds with one another, disagreeing both on synchronic and diachronic responses to 
questions of personal ontology, their seeming irreconcilability due to differences in their 
respective metaphysical backgrounds and stances concerning certain thought 
experiments. It is my contention that both views suffer difficulties found when exploring 
these factors. In Chapter 1, I will present PCT in various forms while demonstrating 
flaws and inconsistencies in each formulation of the account. In Chapter 2, the main 
arguments for and against animalism will be considered. Though animalism will be 
shown to fare better than its PCT rivals, it must abandon some of our important intuitions 
in order to do so. In my third chapter I will attempt to resurrect the ancient view of 
hylomorphism as a theory of personal ontology and argue that it has the resources to 
provide a formidable challenge to the two main views. I will offer hylomorphic responses 
to general problems faced by accounts of personal identity such as intransitivity, 
circularity, fission, and composition, and show how its answers are an improvement over 
those given by PCT and animalism. 
Though hylomorphism has recently received increased attention in the analytic 
literature, it has mostly been as a theory in the philosophy of mind.
22
 Here some have 
borrowed from arguments found in the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas which attempt to 
demonstrate the immateriality of the intellect. There is a fair number of philosophers 
currently working in the philosophy of mind who argue for some aspect of non-
reductionism or non-physicalism, and Thomists aware of the current debates are 
beginning to insert arguments from Aquinas accordingly. My own approach is decidedly 
different. Instead of explicitly focusing on the immateriality of the intellect, I will 
                                                          
22
 For example, see David Oderberg, “Concepts, Dualism, and the Human Intellect,” in Alessandro 
Antonietti, Antonella Corradini, and E. Jonathan Lowe, Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman and Littlefield, 2008): 211-33; 
David Oderberg, “Hylemorphic Dualism,” in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul, Personal 
Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 70-99; John Haldane, “A Return to Form in the 
Philosophy of Mind,” Ratio, Vol. 11 (December, 1998): 253-277 ; John Haldane, “The Metaphysics of 
Intellect(ion),” in Michael Baur, Intelligence and Philosophy of Mind, ACPA Proceedings, Vol. 80 (2007): 
39-55. 
 8 
interpret hylomorphism as a theory of personal ontology which posits as our most 
fundamental constituents matter and form.  
Though hylomorphism is a sort of dualism, as will be explored later on, it is 
substantially different than typical formulations of Cartesian dualism, and thus avoids its 
most obvious pitfalls. This will become apparent in my defence of hylomorphism as a 
brand of animalism in section 3.2. In sections 3.3 – 3.3.2 I will explore an alternative 
interpretation of hylomorphism, suggested most notably by David Hershenov, that argues 
that we are contingently animals.
23
 The way in which this should be understood will be 
analyzed, as well as the repercussions it may have for thought experiments present in the 
literature. The goal of my thesis is to demonstrate that a hylomorphic account should be 
granted serious consideration in the personal ontology debate due to its ability to respond 
(successfully, I believe) to the problems faced by other views. Whether the reader finds 
one interpretation of hylomorphism or the other more plausible is not as crucial to my 
argument as the disjunctive supposition that either one could be considered an engaged 
participant in discussions of personal identity. By its end, I hope to have accented and 
responded to Hershonov‟s remark that Hylomorphism “is a promising and wrongfully 
neglected research project.”24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 David Hershenov, “A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity,” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 82, No. 3 (2008): 481-502; “Soulless Organisms? 
Hylomorphism vs. Animalism,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (Forthcoming). 
24
 Hershenov, “A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments,” 481. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY THEORY 
1.1 “Un- Locke-ing” the Memory Criterion 
John Locke is frequently considered to be the progenitor of psychological 
continuity theory, and his discussion of personal identity in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding has historically been seen as the starting point for the debate in modern 
philosophy. Accordingly, my own discussion of PCT will begin with his conception. 
Locke‟s position is that a person persists as long as his or her consciousness does: “in this 
alone consists personal identity, i.e., the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the 
identity of that person.”25 Many have taken Locke to mean that as long as certain 
memories persist, so does that person. Thomas Reid famously supposed that “[i]t is 
impossible to understand the meaning of this, unless by consciousness be meant memory, 
the only faculty by which we have an immediate knowledge of our past actions.”26 This 
interpretation follows from Locke‟s own insistence that one cannot be the same 
individual responsible for an action one does not remember committing.
27
  
Locke‟s motivation for giving necessary and sufficient conditions of personal 
identity is to establish an account of moral and legal accountability, both in terms of 
human law and divine law at the Resurrection. As a result, his definition more accurately 
applies to the issue of personhood described above. But later philosophers seem to take 
Locke‟s ideas as closer to an answer to the question of personal ontology. Anthony 
Quinton, while distancing himself from Lockean ideas of spiritual substance, incorporates 
an „empirical‟ definition of the soul as “a series of mental states connected by continuity 
of character and memory,” the soul being “what a person fundamentally is.”28 Though 
Quinton uses the „person‟ terminology, determining our most basic metaphysical nature 
seems to be the goal of subsequent memory theorists, and it is as a theory of our own 
                                                          
25
  John Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” in John Perry, Personal Identity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975): 39. 
26
 Thomas Reid, “Of Mr. Locke‟s Account of Our Personal Identity,” in John Perry, Personal Identity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975): 115 
27
 Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” 48. 
28
 Anthony Quinton, “The Soul,” in John Perry, Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1975): 65 
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fundamental nature that I will approach Locke‟s position and other formulations of the 
memory criterion.  
Prior, then, to introducing what I see as the main problem for PCT in general, I 
will present three historical objections to memory theory as such: intransitivity, 
circularity and backwards causation. The importance of these objections, as well as those 
covered in section 1.2.1, is due to the fact that, properly explicated, they are potential 
problems for any account of personal identity and they will help to elicit the general 
requirements to be met in order to stage a sound defence of my own favoured position 
later on.
29
 
1.1.1 Transitivity and Constancy 
The first historical problem for memory accounts of personal identity is the 
problem of intransitivity. Transitivity is the logical requirement that if two things are 
identical to a third thing, then each must be identical to the other. In other words, if A is 
identical to B and C is identical to B, then C must be identical to A. Thomas Reid 
famously accused Locke‟s memorative account of violating the transitivity of identity. 
His example of intransitive memory connections involves a story of a brave officer who 
has lost certain memories of himself as a boy: 
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for 
robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first 
campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, 
also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the 
standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, 
when made a general, he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had 
absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 
These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr. Locke‟s doctrine, that 
he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, 
and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a 
general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is 
the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general‟s 
consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging; therefore, 
according to Mr. Locke‟s doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. 
Therefore the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person with 
him who was flogged at school.30 
                                                          
29
 In later chapters, I will explicitly focus only on the problems of intransitivity and circularity, though it 
should be understood that a prohibition against backwards causation remains in the background. 
30
 Reid, “Of Mr. Locke‟s Account,” 114-115. 
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There are two key points to notice in Reid‟s thought experiment. The first is that 
the memories considered important for determining identity are those of experiencing 
certain events. This much is present in Locke‟s own formulation of his account when he 
emphasizes conscious reflection of “our past actions.”31 Memories of specific non-
personal facts such as mathematical truths or the dates of historical events, or memories 
of how to perform a certain task or skill are not included in a formulation of personal 
identity over time, as they do not pick out the particularity of one‟s own consciousness. 
The second and most apparent point of Reid‟s example is the violation of transitivity 
which Locke‟s formulation seems to commit. The problem is that the direct memory 
connections had between the officer as a boy and the officer as a young man do not hold 
between the officer as a boy and the officer as an older general. This illustrates the 
common fact that we do indeed lose certain memories over time. I cannot now remember 
everything that I did on this date last year, but we would not wish to say that I am 
ontologically distinct from the individual who did those things (though I may not be 
morally responsible for those actions). The requirement that continuity of personal 
identity uphold this strong connection must therefore be abandoned. 
In order to preserve the transitive relation of identity in a memorative account, 
therefore, a weaker stipulation must be introduced. Derek Parfit‟s formulation of PCT 
does this by differentiating between psychological connectedness and psychological 
continuity.
32
 Psychological connectedness, according to Parfit, “is the holding of 
particular direct psychological connections,” e.g., explicitly remembering a certain action 
that one performed yesterday.
33
 Psychological continuity, on the other hand, “is the 
holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness.”34 Instead of requiring that one 
be capable of explicitly remembering at the present moment all of those actions one has 
performed or otherwise experienced in the past, for psychological continuity one need 
only be a member of a chain of remembering stages in an individual‟s career such that 
each stage is connected to that immediately prior to him or her through direct 
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psychological connections. Parfit further stipulates that the direct psychological 
connections between each link must involve a transfer of at least half of the memories 
contained in that immediately prior in order to qualify as “strong connectedness.”35  
Parfit suggests that his solution thereby avoids Reid‟s objection to the memory 
criterion. The officer as a general, though not sharing direct connectedness with the 
officer as a boy, can be considered identical to him because they are members of a chain 
of direct psychological connectedness (presumably of the strong variety) that runs from 
the officer as a general, through the officer as a young man, and to the officer as a boy, as 
well as through any and all intermediary links necessary for the transfer of strong 
connectedness. Consequently, if what we mean by identical is psychologically 
continuous, then the officer as a general is identical to the officer as a young man, the 
officer as a young man is identical to the officer as a boy, and the officer as a general is 
identical (psychologically continuous) to the officer as a boy. In other words, A (general) 
= B (young man), C (boy) = B (young man), and C (boy) = A (general). The law of 
transitivity of identity is thus seemingly preserved by updating Locke‟s memory account 
so as to include Parfit‟s suggestions.  
It is often assumed that this strategy has successfully solved the intransitivity 
problem.
36
 My own position, however, is that Parfit‟s modifications have not eliminated 
it completely. The notion of psychological continuity may superficially achieve a 
transitive relation, and it may allow one to respond to Reid‟s thought experiment, but I 
would argue that it does so at the expense of abandoning claims of numerical identity. As 
an example, consider the relation taller than. We can construct a transitive formulation of 
taller than by positing it as a relation between three individuals: B is taller than A, C is 
taller than B, and consequently, C is taller than A. Let us further suppose that B is taller 
than A by two inches and C is taller than B by four inches. On the face of it, we have 
transitivity of a property (taller than). But upon investigation of the details of each 
relation (two inches between B and A, four inches between C and B), the relations had 
between the three individuals are not exactly similar. It would not follow from the 
transitivity of the taller than relation that C is either two inches or four inches taller than 
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A. We want to admit, without question, that C is taller than A. This much we learn from 
the transitive relation. But also within the relation we find that C is more-taller-than B 
than B is taller than A. The relations between these three individuals are similar but they 
are not identical. 
Translating this example to a case of supposed personal identity, we find that we 
are faced with a problem. Consider an individual P at a certain time T, an individual Q at 
T
+2 hours
, and an individual R at T
+2 years. Let us assume that, by Parfit‟s standards, P is 
psychologically continuous with Q, Q is psychologically continuous with R, and R is 
psychologically continuous with P. In saying that P is psychologically continuous with Q 
what we mean to say is that there is a chain of direct connectedness between them. Their 
being psychologically continuous is thus constituted by and dependent on the direct 
connectedness upheld by their intermediaries. As Parfit admits, direct connectedness 
admits of degrees.
37
 We can imagine a case in which throughout a particular day I was 
considerably drowsy and oblivious to my surroundings. On the following day, my direct 
memories of the day before may still be at least half of those I had on that day (thus 
qualifying as strong connectedness), but it would be a weaker direct connection than if I 
had been fully awake and aware of what I was doing at the time. Let us suppose that the 
direct connectedness between P and Q is very strong due to their minimal separation in 
time.
38
 It may also be plausible to assume that Q and R, while sufficiently strong in their 
connectedness to qualify as psychologically continuous, share a weaker relation, due to 
their separation in time, than the relation had by P and Q. As both relations achieve 
psychological continuity, they each do so to different degrees. It might be said that P is 
more psychologically continuous with Q than Q is psychologically continuous with R. If 
for memory theorists, and PCT advocates in general, psychological continuity just is an 
identity relation, then we would have to say that P is more identical to Q than Q is 
identical to R. But if anything is a strict dichotomy, identity is. Either a certain thing is 
identical to another thing or it is not. And it seems that our concerns for personal identity 
rely on that very fact.  
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Bernard Williams emphasizes this point by considering cases in which you are 
imprisoned and forced to undergo sessions of excruciating physical pain.
 39
 At certain 
points in these sessions, you are also forced to undergo psychological manipulations, 
such that each successive manipulation leaves you with a considerable loss of memories. 
Williams argues throughout his formulations of the thought experiment that it is always a 
valid question to ask whether or not one will actually persist through each ordeal. 
Responding in a way that makes one‟s identity a matter of degree is no consolation for 
the imprisoned individual. She wants to know at each moment whether or not the next 
session of torture will be something that she herself will have to endure. If her identity is 
only partially preserved will the sessions of torture hurt less? I think questions like these 
illustrate the absurdity of admitting degrees of identity into one‟s account. In the words of 
Thomas Reid, “The identity of a person is a perfect identity: wherever it is real, it admits 
of no degrees...For this cause, I have first considered personal identity, as that which is 
perfect in its kind, and the natural measure of that which is imperfect.”40  
Parfit‟s account is at least consistent in this regard. He correctly concludes that his 
notion of identity as psychological continuity admits of degrees, and he emphasizes such 
facts in his famous “Spectrum” cases.41 David Lewis likewise concedes, “Identity 
certainly cannot be a matter of degree. But... personal identity may be a matter of degree 
because personhood is a matter of degree, even though identity is not.”42 Parfit and Lewis 
are right to abandon numerical identity in preserving psychological continuity, because as 
the above argument shows it cannot be upheld as such. But if the arguments defending 
identity have any weight, then Parfit‟s solution will fail to be a solution at all. Though the 
PCT advocate can avoid Reid‟s intransitivity objection, it can only do so by clinging to a 
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relation that is less than numerical identity, which seems a high price to pay for a memory 
account. 
Before moving on, it may help to address the claim that the transitive numerical 
identity relation that I am demanding is too strict and that it will defeat any account of 
personal identity. While I do see it as a problem to be faced by all views, and one which I 
will use to approach the alternatives explicated below, I will argue here that there is room 
for fruitful debate within the restriction. The reason Parfit‟s formulation of PCT fails is 
due to the fact that each stage of an individual‟s career in the schema has a different 
relationship with another considered stage. In order to preserve transitive numerical 
identity, each member of an individual‟s chain of existence must be related in an identical 
way to the other members. Three possibilities come to mind. First, one could espouse a 
memory theory in which all instances of an individual over time share a single identical 
memory. The relation has this memory as a member could perhaps be strictly identical 
between stages at different times. A second approach could be a physical criterion such 
that each instance of an individual has as a member a certain identical physical 
constituent.  
If neither of these can be defended, one might be justified in forgoing Parfit‟s 
reductionist requirement. One may posit (as many anti-reductionists have
43
) a continuing 
immaterial part as the explanation of an individual‟s persistence over time, to which an 
individual may also be identical. The stipulation that a continuing part to which instances 
of an individual share an identical relation be itself identical over time would, at the risk 
of eliciting an infinite regress, have to be a simple, brute and unanalyzable fact. One 
could then borrow from the anti-criterialist literature to flesh out the position.
44
 
Admittedly, the transitive numerical identity requirement limits the options one can 
choose from in the personal identity debate, but, if anything, this is a virtue of the 
objection.           
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1.1.2 Circularity and Quasi-Memory 
The second historical objection to Locke‟s memory account of personal identity is 
that it contains, in its definition, terms which already assume the persistence of a single 
entity. If the goal of a criterion of personal identity is to establish the existence of a 
continuing subject, it cannot frame that definition around an idea of a person already in 
place. If it does so it commits an act of circularity. The inspiration for this objection and 
its application to PCT comes from Joseph Butler when he says that “consciousness of 
personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any 
more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.”45 As 
Butler‟s remarks indicate, circularity seems to be a particularly potent problem for 
attempts to define personal identity in terms of memory. I will attempt to provide an 
analysis of why this may be so, and to defend the objection against more recent replies by 
Sydney Shoemaker. Shoemaker‟s own concept of “quasi-memories” will be shown to be 
just as circular as Locke‟s original account.  
To understand why Locke‟s formulation of the memory theory is circular, 
consider his supposition that “as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any 
past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same 
consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self.”46 Here 
Locke suggests that if someone can remember doing certain things, then it was he himself 
who did them. But as Bernard Williams points out, this simple formulation of memory 
theory is tautologous.
47
 Properly elaborated, it means that if an individual can remember 
that he himself did something, then it was he himself who did it. Or, if A remembers A 
doing S, then A is identical to A. In order to avoid the tautology and offer any kind of 
informative criteria, it must not be said that A remembers A doing S. There must be some 
lesser requirement that does not assume that A has done the prior action in a statement of 
the definition of A. If, as Shoemaker argues, it is a logical truth that actually 
remembering a certain thing being done by me guarantees that it was me who did that 
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thing, then we must not include a reference to actually remembering in our definition of 
personal identity.
 48
  
Once we abandon the actually remembering component, the circularity of the 
memory account comes into play. Our reformulated memory criterion would have to say 
that if A seems to remember doing S (that is, it appears to A herself that she remembers 
doing S), then A is the same individual who did S. But this immediately raises the 
question. How can we be sure that it actually was A that performed the action that A 
remembers being done? As we have stated, we cannot attach A to the action within the 
definition itself without it being trivially tautologous, and as a result, it seems we must 
look elsewhere in order to determine the validity of the memory. The most obvious way 
of doing so would be to appeal to some criterion other than PCT, such as bodily 
continuity. For example, if a young woman were to claim in a court of law that she 
remembered being beaten by her father on a certain night, the first step towards validating 
her claim would be to establish that she actually was physically present in the specified 
location at the specified time. We would thus already have a working conception of the 
girl‟s persistence over time in validating her memory claims. If determining whether a 
seeming memory is an actual memory requires a prior understanding of personal identity, 
then we have come full circle. Personal identity would be explained in terms of memory, 
and validating the operative term „remembers‟ would include invoking notions of 
personal identity. If false memories are a distinct possibility, and the validity of 
experience-memories cannot be determined “from the inside,” or making reference only 
to psychological terms, then this may undermine the appeal to memory in establishing 
personal identity over time. 
In response to this objection, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that a memorative 
account of personal identity can be constructed which both avoids tautology and provides 
a method of validation without requiring reference to bodily continuity. It can do so by 
employing what he calls “quasi-memory”.49 Shoemaker defines quasi-memory as  
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a kind of knowledge of past events such that someone‟s having this sort of 
knowledge of an event does involve there being a correspondence between 
his present cognitive state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was 
of the event, but such that this correspondence, although otherwise just 
like that which exists in memory, does not necessarily involve that past 
state‟s having been a state of the very same person who subsequently has 
the knowledge.50 
This definition corresponds to the aforementioned formulation, A seems to remember 
(someone) doing S. Shoemaker would translate „seems to remember‟ as „quasi-
remembers‟. Importantly, quasi-remembering includes actual remembering as a special 
case, in which the individual I quasi-remember doing S was actually me. But if quasi-
memory includes both veridical and non-veridical cases of apparent remembering, the 
notion has not gotten us any closer to a criterion of identity. Shoemaker‟s next step, then, 
is to supplement his quasi-memory account so as to include only those memories which 
are valid (or nearly so), and he must do this without explicitly invoking a tautology.  
Shoemaker offers three initial requirements that must be met for an apparent 
memory to be an actual memory.
51
 The first is that I must now be in a state of seemingly 
remembering a certain experience, which can perhaps be understood as a dispositional 
state. The second is that what I seem to remember happening did at least happen to 
someone. In order for there to be an experience of witnessing something “from the 
inside” there must have been someone by whom the event was experienced.52 
Shoemaker‟s quasi-memory meets both of these requirements. The third requirement is 
the one on which we intuitively want to insist in order to complete the formula. This is 
the stipulation that the individual who originally experienced the event that I remember 
experiencing was in fact me. But as we have seen already, this last requirement is not one 
that Shoemaker can resort to without falling back into circularity. Instead of saying that 
my quasi-memory of an experience logically connects me to the original experience, 
Shoemaker suggests that we should say that my quasi-memory is causally connected to 
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the original experience.
53
 In other words, the original experience of a certain event must 
be the cause of my remembered experience of that same event. 
The need for a properly causal relationship between the original experience and 
my memory of it becomes apparent when we consider some examples of non-actual 
memories. Imagine that a certain experience that you have had has become forgotten.
54
 
All attempts at reviving the memory have failed. You approach a hypnotist who claims he 
can implant memories, perhaps as a last resort. But this particularly devious hypnotist 
cares nothing about the type of memory you have requested, and he completely 
disregards your written instructions. He does not even know what type of memory you 
wanted. Amazingly, this devious hypnotist, who implants random memories in his 
unsuspecting victims, manages to implant a memory that is exactly similar to the one you 
have forgotten. Intrinsically, there would be no way to tell the difference between the 
original and this newly implanted replacement. The apparent memory meets the three 
original requirements for veridicality. You are in a state of at least seemingly 
remembering, the original experience did happen to someone, and the individual who 
originally experienced the event was in fact you. But we would not wish to include this 
example in the category of actual memories. And the reason for this, Shoemaker argues, 
is because the original experience is not the cause of the present memory, not even 
indirectly.  
But we can redesign the thought experiment so as to include the causal element 
while still producing a possibly non-actual memory. Imagine in this case that the 
hypnotist is a little less devious. Years prior to hiring the hypnotist, you explain to him a 
certain experience that you have had in vivid detail (perhaps he is also your psychiatrist 
or a friend of the family). Since that meeting, you have irretrievably forgotten the event 
that you had experienced. But the hypnotist knows all about this memory that you had of 
the event because you told him all of the precise details. With this information he is able 
to skillfully implant a memory that is exactly similar to the original. Let us say that they 
are, once again, intrinsically indistinguishable. This memory, too, meets the first three 
requirements for veridicality. It also meets the initial formulation of the causal 
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requirement. Your original experience is the cause of your memory of it, albeit indirectly 
through a causal chain in the hypnotist. But it seems not to be a case of actual 
remembering.
55
  
Or for greater plausibility, consider a less fanciful case. In a recent study by 
psychologists E.F. Loftus and J.E. Pickrell, participants were led into believing that they 
had experienced an event in their childhood which they had not actually experienced.
56
 
Loftus and Pickrell obtained information about three events that the participants had 
actually experienced. They also added a fourth event which was based on no such 
truthfulness. With the help of family members, some participants (about 25%) were 
convinced that all four events had happened to them. In interviews, these participants 
confessed details about the fourth event as if it were an actual memory. Assuming that the 
participants did not actually experience the fourth event, this case seems like a real 
example of memory implantation. We can slightly adjust the example to fit the hypnotist 
framework by suggesting that the family members knew that the participants had actually 
experienced the fourth events, but that they had also completely forgotten about them. It 
would then be the case that the content of the memory was veridical but the causal chain 
seems too convoluted to be considered an actual memory held by the participants. What 
these examples illustrate is that the causal requirement needs to be supplemented to 
properly capture only those quasi-memories that are actually cases of remembering.  
Shoemaker admits that between the original experience and the memory of the 
event there must be a causal connection “of the appropriate sort.”57 He offers an 
elaboration by introducing his notions of “M-type causal chain[s]” and “M-
connectedness.”58 M-connectedness is Shoemaker‟s specified causal requirement that is 
employed in order to avoid the troubling cases outlined above. He argues that  
[t]wo mental states, existing at different times, are directly M-connected if 
the later of them contains a quasic-memory [a causally related memory] 
which is linked by an M-type causal chain to a corresponding cognitive 
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and sensory state contained in the earlier. And...two total mental states are 
M-connected if either (1) they are directly M-connected, or (2) there is 
some third total mental state to which each of them is M-connected.59   
Shoemaker‟s reply to problem cases relies on his definition of M-type causal chains. 
Unfortunately, he fails to precisely define what the relations between members in an M-
type causal chain would be. Shoemaker supposes that the most plausible solution is found 
in a functionalist theory of mind in which a memory “is a „functional state‟, i.e., a state 
which is definable in terms of its relations (primarily its causal relations) to sensory 
inputs, behavioural outputs, and (especially) other functional states.”60 But this just 
restates the problem. Even as a functional state, your memory of an experience in the 
second formulation of the hypnotist example is causally related to later functional states 
of yourself, albeit through intermediary functional states in the hypnotist.  
Shoemaker also hints at a requirement of spatio-temporal continuity,
61
 and this 
seems to be his underlying assumption, but if he truly wants this to be his requirement, 
then it seems he has returned to a circular definition of personal identity, only a more 
complex one. Admittedly, the reason the cases above are troubling is due to a seeming 
violation of spatio-temporal continuity. The causal chain between the original experience 
and the memory of that experience “jumps” through other people, namely the hypnotist in 
the first example, and family members in the second. But if a “no jumping” clause must 
include a reference to other people through which the causal chain cannot jump, then 
Shoemaker‟s criterion presupposes some conception of personal identity. We understand 
what “jumping” means by assuming a bodily distinction between two individuals. 
Perhaps there is some way that spatio-temporal continuity can be explained in non-bodily 
terms, and a functionalist theory of mind may even be a method of doing so, but in his 
defence of the memory criterion Shoemaker offers no such account. As a result, Butler‟s 
objection that veridical memory presupposes personal identity, and thus cannot be used as 
a criterion, remains unscathed.
62
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Though solely considered as an objection to PCT in this section, as will be 
explained below, circularity is a problem that must be resolved in one way or another by 
each of the three main accounts considered in this thesis. But before moving on to 
alternative views, there is one more historical objection against memory accounts in 
particular that may help to more resolutely demonstrate their difficulties. 
1.1.3 Backward Causation 
The last historical objection to memory accounts that I will briefly consider here 
is the objection most recently made explicit by David Hershenov. Hershenov argues that 
any psychological continuity theory that relies on notions of memory to explain identity 
or continuity over time necessarily commits itself to backward causation. The ubiquitous 
phenomenon of losing memories will, for the memory theorist, alter the origins of what 
we essentially are. If actions that we perform or memories that we lose now can change 
the moment at which we began to exist (assuming we are persons), then an element of the 
past has been altered by an element of the present, which if not completely absurd, is an 
unwelcome consequence. I include this argument in the historical objections portion 
because, though the problem has only recently been formulated, I believe there are hints 
of the objection in the words of Joseph Butler when he says that facts concerning the 
history of an individual‟s identity are “prior to all consideration of its remembering or 
forgetting; since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past 
matter of fact.
63
 
Recall that for Locke, in order for an individual to be identical to the person who 
performed a certain prior action she must be able to “repeat the idea of [the] past action 
with the same consciousness it had of it at first.” In other words, one must have an 
experience-memory of the event. If one no longer has that same experience-memory, then 
one is no longer identical to the individual who performed it. But if I lose a memory now, 
does this change who in the past I am identical to? Hershenov‟s backward causation 
objection elicits the inherent absurdity in this premise. For 
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[a]ssume you have memories extending back to your early childhood. 
Then through either a natural process of forgetting (or a minor stroke or 
blow to your head), you lose your earliest memory of something that 
happened to you. Let‟s say that this memory was of an experience of an 
event T1 (1937). Your earliest memory is now of a later time T2 (1938). 
That means you are not identical to a being that existed in 1937- at least 
according to the unreconstructed Lockean memory criterion...If the earliest 
experience you can recall is now 1938, and you are not identical to any 
person that existed earlier, then that actually means you have changed 
your origins! You have come into existence at a later time than was true 
before. Thus an event in the present, a memory loss, causes your first 
moment of existing in the past to change.64 
Nor, as Hershenov explains, does adapting the memory criterion so as to require only 
overlapping chains of psychological continuity avoid the problem. As mentioned above, 
for Parfit the continuity of a proper psychological chain requires a transfer of at least half 
of the memories from one link to the next. So if I were to receive a head injury such that 
less than half of my memories remained, I have changed my past origin from years ago to 
much more recently.
65
 
Beyond Hershenov‟s specific points, I believe there is also another problem in 
admitting a backward alteration in one‟s origin. If one wants to say, as Locke does,66 that 
one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, then changing my origins brings into 
existence a whole new entity. There exists a chain of psychological connections that 
begins in 1937 and ends with my head injury (of the first variety). Let us refer to the 
individual constituted by this chain as A. Because I continue to exist, and I am still 
psychologically continuous with an individual beginning to exist in 1938, I am a distinct 
individual. Let us refer to myself constituted by this chain as individual B. Based on this 
information, we can gather that there is a long series of memories (from 1938 onward) 
that is shared by both A and B. It would seem to follow that an experienced event in 1938 
was actually experienced by two people simultaneously. If A witnessed a murder in 1938, 
then B did as well. There would in fact be two witnesses to the crime when the law court 
documents only claim one person was present. Even if it were not true that two people 
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simultaneously experienced the event from the 1938 perspective, at the moment I lose my 
memory of 1937, and thus become a different individual than A, it is retroactively 
admitted that there were two persons present. Working from a temporal parts 
background, David Lewis welcomes such consequences,
67
 but I think few would be 
willing to follow him in accepting the obviously counter-intuitive consequences of a 
multiple occupancy view.
68
 In conclusion, if a PCT account which relies on a memory 
criterion must resort to backward causation and multiple occupancy, it might be a wiser 
solution to abandon that criterion altogether.  
Thus far, in the first half of this chapter, I have considered three main historical 
objections to a memory criterion of personal identity: intransitivity, circularity, and 
backward causation. I have shown that even reformulations of PCT accounts that utilize 
some aspect of the memory criterion must admit unwelcome consequences for their 
views such as the abandonment of numerical identity, a denial of the possibility of false 
experience-memories, or multiple-occupancy. Due to these concerns, it may seem a more 
plausible solution to reject the memory criterion and look for an account of personal 
identity elsewhere. But before exploring other non-PCT views, in the following section I 
will attempt to give the justifications for a wider PCT account their due, and then offer 
possible objections to psychological continuity in general. 
1.2 Body-Switching and Fissioning out of Existence 
Due perhaps to literary encouragement from imaginary science-fiction scenarios, 
there has been a continuing interest throughout the history of the personal identity debate 
in so-called cases of “body-switching.” This usually involves an initial experience of 
existing in or through a particular human body (one‟s normal first-person perspective), 
followed by a transportation or transplantation of some crucial aspect of one‟s identity 
such that at the end of the procedure one seems to experience the world from the point of 
view of an entirely different body. Or from a third-person perspective, the procedure ends 
with the particular personality of an individual seemingly being instantiated in an entirely 
different body than before. John Locke may be the first to seriously suppose such a case 
when he says,  
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should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the 
prince‟s past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as 
deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same person 
with the prince, accountable only for the prince‟s actions.69 
A more modern formulation is provided by Sydney Shoemaker in his Self-
Knowledge and Self-Identity, which he calls “the change-of-body argument”.70 In his 
example, we are to imagine that the brain of a certain human being (call him “Mr. 
Brown”), which we assume can be safely extracted from its original cranium intact, is 
accidentally placed in the recently brainless cranium of another human organism (“Mr. 
Robinson”). If the brain transplant “takes” then we would have the resulting combination 
of Mr. Brown‟s brain and Mr. Robinson‟s body. Let us follow Shoemaker‟s suggestion 
and call the functioning combination “Mr. Brownson”.71 Given that the transplant is 
successful, we can imagine Brownson awakening from the surgery only to be shocked at 
seeing what he claims is his own body on the opposite operating table. Furthermore, 
Shoemaker supposes that Brownson would respond to the name „Brown‟, recognize 
members of Brown‟s family without Robinson ever having met them, reveal certain facts 
about Brown that only Brown himself would know, and over time demonstrate the 
particular personality traits formerly exhibited by Brown. Following Locke, Shoemaker 
argues that “[t]here is little question that many of us would be inclined, and rather 
strongly inclined, to say that while Brownson has Robinson‟s body he is actually 
Brown.”72 But if this is the case, then bodily continuity cannot be the criterion of personal 
identity over time, since Brown‟s identity has continued beyond that of his body.  
Shoemaker argues that the temptation to stress the continuity of the brain is also 
misleading.
73
 For even if Robinson had kept his own brain, if he had somehow awoken 
with all of the characteristics, memories, beliefs and desires of Brown, then we would be 
just as likely to consider that that person was in fact Brown rather than Robinson. 
Therefore it is the continuation of Brown‟s psychology that matters, not any specific 
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physical continuity. In a later work, Shoemaker takes this intuition even further, 
considering the possibility of a “brain-state transfer”: 
Imagine a society living in an environment in which an increase in some 
sort of radiation has made it impossible for a human body to remain 
healthy for more than a few years. Being highly advanced technologically, 
the society has developed the following procedure for dealing with this. 
For each person there is a stock of duplicate bodies, cloned from cells 
taken from that person and grown by an accelerated process in a radiation-
proof vault, where they are then stored. Periodically a person goes into the 
hospital for a „body-change‟. This consists in his total brain-state being 
transferred to the brain of one of his duplicate bodies. At the end of the 
procedure the  original body is incinerated. We are to imagine that in this 
society going in for a body-change is as routine an occurrence as going to 
have one‟s teeth cleaned is in ours. It is taken for granted by everyone that 
the procedure is person-preserving.74 
Derek Parfit likewise considers such events “person-preserving.” Similar to 
Shoemaker‟s brain-state transfer, Parfit makes use of a science-fiction staple, the 
“Teletransporter,” to demonstrate that our intuitions point us away from a bodily account 
of personal identity over time.
75
 In his imaginary case, at the press of a button, atoms on 
Mars can be rearranged so as to precisely “transport” one‟s exact functional state, while 
concurrently disintegrating one‟s body on earth. One‟s relocated psychology can then 
continue to consist of the same beliefs, intentions, and desires as it would have otherwise.  
If the above thought experiments do elicit the appropriate responses, then it seems 
a strong case can be made for some sort of psychological criterion of personal identity. 
Even if brain-state transfers or Teletransportation are hard to fathom, there is the 
seemingly plausible case of the brain transplant, which bodily and animalist accounts of 
personal identity must confront. As will be investigated in more detail in Chapter Two, 
even Eric Olson admits that there is a “transplant intuition”.76 Accordingly, philosophers 
opposed to PCT have offered replies to these types of thought experiments. In the 
following sections I will introduce an historical objection to the PCT advocate‟s transfer 
arguments, consider some counter-replies from PCT theorists, and ultimately end with 
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what I shall argue are crushing reformulations of the original objection that can only be 
avoided by abandoning the Parfitian/Shoemakerian thesis. 
1.2.1 Reduplication and Double-Transplants 
As I see it, the greatest difficulty for PCT advocates who argue for their view 
based on our intuitions in the “body-switching” examples above is the problem of fission, 
or reduplication. Historically, Bernard Williams is credited with first posing the 
reduplication objection against a memory-based PCT account.
77
 Recall that according to 
Shoemaker, even without a brain transplant, if Robinson were to somehow awaken with 
all of Brown‟s memories, beliefs, desires and intentions, then we would be tempted to say 
that Robinson just is Brown in this case. To follow Williams‟ formulation, let us refer to 
Robinson as Charles and Brown as an historical figure, Guy Fawkes.
78
 So in this account, 
Charles awakens with the memories, beliefs and intentions of Guy Fawkes, and we are 
tempted to view him just as Guy Fawkes himself. But as Williams points out, it is also 
logically possible for Charles‟ brother Robert to awaken at the same time with the exact 
same set of memories, beliefs and desires formerly held by Guy Fawkes. What should we 
say in this situation? If they equally share the psychology of Guy Fawkes we do not seem 
to have a principled reason for saying that either man is Guy Fawkes to the exclusion of 
the other. But we also cannot say that they are both identical to Guy Fawkes without 
violating the transitivity of identity. For if each man was identical to Guy Fawkes, then 
they would have to be identical to each other, which is clearly not the case. Even 
considering solely psychological features, very soon after the “transfer” each man would 
contribute separate experiences and memories to that psychology which would be 
particular to each man himself.  
Though Williams‟ example is explicitly aimed at Lockean- type memory 
accounts, it can easily be adapted as an objection to Shoemaker‟s thesis and justifications 
for PCT in general.
79
 Imagine that in Shoemaker‟s brain-state transfer society, an 
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individual, call him Daniel, arrives for his scheduled body-change. A body clone is 
prepared, and an extra is put on stand-by in case something goes wrong. When initiating 
the procedure, the operator accidentally presses the transfer button twice and both body 
doubles are infused with Daniel‟s brain-state simultaneously. Though Daniel‟s original 
body is destroyed as planned, two of his duplicate bodies awaken with the exact 
memories, beliefs and desires that Daniel had before the procedure. But what has 
happened to Daniel? Once again it seems that neither duplicate can lay exclusive claim to 
Daniel‟s psychology. Nor can they both be Daniel because as soon as they exit the 
hospital in opposite directions, they are no longer identical with each other. It seems that 
Daniel has ceased to exist, even though his psychology has survived. What we learn from 
the reduplication objection, then, is that psychological continuity is not sufficient for the 
continuation of personal identity, and this may cause us to critically question our 
intuitions in the original brain-state transfer case.  
One may suppose at this point that the reduplication objection might only be a 
problem for Shoemaker‟s later formulation of brain-state transfers. But there is reason to 
believe that a related objection can be made against PCT advocates who argue from 
Shoemaker‟s original Brown/Brownson scenario. We begin such an objection by 
returning to an emphasis of the locus of one‟s psychology, the brain, for in the original 
Brown/Brownson case it was the whole brain that was transplanted. Studies have shown 
that the two cerebral hemispheres of a normal human brain can be separated by severing 
the band of nerves called the corpus callosum.
80
 As Thomas Nagel notes, this type of 
procedure was in fact used at one time in order to limit or cease the violent episodes of 
epileptics.
81
 Furthermore, some individuals, patients who suffer severe strokes for 
example, can survive the loss of functionality in one of the hemispheres.
82
 It is widely 
held that each cerebral hemisphere engages in separate activities and houses distinct 
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psychological functions, but, following Derek Parfit,
83
 let us suppose that one could be 
left sufficiently in tact for psychological continuity if either hemisphere is retained.  
Based on these facts, David Wiggins has famously devised a fission-type counter-
argument to Shoemaker‟s Brown/Brownson example.84 Imagine that, before transplant, 
Brown‟s brain is split along its corpus callosum and the two hemispheres are removed 
separately. The right hemisphere is then placed in Robinson‟s body. This transplant is 
successful, and though his psychology is notably reduced, there are over time enough of 
Brown‟s characteristics shining through Robinson‟s body for us to refer to Brownson as 
Brown himself. But let us also consider the possibility that the left hemisphere of 
Brown‟s original brain is placed in a third body, call him Smith, and this transplant too is 
successful. We may as well call this combination Brownsmith. If over roughly the same 
amount of time, Brownsmith and Brownson both begin to instantiate a recognizable 
portion of Brown‟s memories, beliefs and desires, we may be tempted to say that 
Brown‟s double transplant is what Parfit refers to as “a double success”.85  
But once again considering the requirement that identity be a transitive relation, 
this cannot be the case. If Brownsmith is identical to Brown, and Brownson is also 
identical to Brown, then it would have to follow that Brownsmith is identical to 
Brownson. But for the reasons given above (namely that immediately upon 
transplantation, memories particular to each man‟s situation will contribute to Brown‟s 
psychology) they cannot be identical to each other. What the case of fission illustrates is 
that either psychological continuity must abandon the transitive relation (and therefore 
abandon numerical identity altogether) or to preserve that notion, PCT must be 
abandoned itself. 
The problem of reduplication and the related problem of fission have been well-
documented in the personal identity literature.
86
 Though it is an enduring difficulty that I 
believe must necessarily be addressed by the PCT theorist, the purpose of its inclusion in 
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this section is not simply to rehash an old problem, but to use its formulations 
heuristically so as to gather relevant insights from the replies it has elicited. Accordingly, 
in the following sections I will first investigate possible responses to the fission objection, 
and secondly, I will demonstrate the inadequacy of these responses. Ultimately, it will be 
argued that the reduplication/fission objection stands unanswered in its final 
formulations, thus providing a compelling reason to abandon PCT. 
1.2.2 Replies, Responses, and Further Stipulations 
Though he is himself a PCT theorist, the most detailed and insightful formulations 
of the reduplication and fission objections can be found in the work of Derek Parfit. 
Almost immediately in his discussion of personal identity in Reasons and Persons, Parfit 
introduces a reduplication version of his Teletransporter thought experiment: 
Several years pass, during which I am often Teletransported. I am now 
back in the cubicle, ready for another trip to Mars. But this time, when I 
press the green button, I do not lose consciousness. There is a whirring 
sound, then  silence. I leave the cubicle, and say to the attendant: „It‟s not 
working. What did I do wrong?‟ 
„It‟s working‟, he replies, handing me a printed card. This reads: „The 
New Scanner records your blueprint without destroying your brain and 
body. We hope that you will welcome the opportunities which this 
technical advance offers.‟ 
The attendant tells me that I am one of the first people to use the New 
Scanner. He adds that, if I stay an hour, I can use the Intercom to see and 
talk to myself on Mars. 
„Wait a minute‟, I reply, „If I‟m here I can‟t also be on Mars‟.87  
Parfit adds a further twist to the story by stipulating that the new procedure leaves his 
original self with a heart ailment which will lead to his death in a few short days. Because 
of the overlapping existence of Parfit and his duplicate, it cannot be the case that they are 
identical. Even though after his impending death there will be a psychologically 
continuous replacement, Parfit‟s numerical identity will not be preserved. Parfit calls this 
“The Branch-Line Case”.88 
As mentioned earlier, Parfit uses such thought experiments to argue that 
numerical identity is not what matters to us. In his branch-line case, when faced with an 
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impending heart attack, Parfit argues that one should not view such an event as badly as 
death. There will be a psychological continuer to complete one‟s projects, desires and 
intentions, and that is all that matters. Likewise with the double-transplant, one should 
view the prospect of double-transplantation not as fissioning out of existence, but rather 
as surviving in a less than numerical sense. In my introduction, I included objections to 
Parfit‟s thesis which demonstrated the counter-intuitive consequences of emphasizing 
only qualitative identity. There is also the further objection by Shoemaker which stresses 
an individual‟s concern for the continuance of pleasure and cessation of pain.89 If, as 
should be assumed, it is in an individual‟s nature to desire pleasure, then it is also of its 
nature to wish that that pleasure continue. But what is desired is not the continuance of 
pleasure simpliciter, but rather the continuance of pleasure experienced by that same 
individual. This, Shoemaker argues, just follows from our understanding of human 
mental states such as pain and pleasure.
90
 For these reasons, abandoning numerical 
identity does not seem to be a viable reply to the reduplication/fission objection. 
One may also respond to the fission objection by appealing to a multiple 
occupancy view. According to the multiple occupancy thesis, prior to the double 
transplant, there are actually two persons in Brown‟s place. Both of the resulting persons 
Brownsmith and Brownson were already present in the place of Brown and thus no entity 
was actually split. Brownsmith and Brownson are not required to be identical to each 
other because there was never a single individual with which they both shared their 
identity. Harold Noonan suggests that any statements describing Brown, as well as any „I‟ 
statements used by Brown himself, may actually refer ambiguously to either or both of 
the pre-fission entities.
91
 In advancing such a view, both Lewis and Noonan make use of 
the four-dimensionalist language of “person-stages” rather than enduring persons as 
such,
92
 but this locutionary exercise fails to avoid the difficulties for the view. As 
mentioned above, the main problem with the multiple occupancy thesis is that it seems to 
commit to backward causation. The number of pre-fission individuals coincident with 
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Brown depends on the future event of fission and the determinate number of offshoots 
such a procedure creates. Additionally, there is the glaring epistemological difficulty of 
not being in a present position able to determine how many persons are now present in 
one‟s physical location. My inability to determine whether or not my usage of the 
pronoun „I‟ refers ambiguously to two individuals seems an unwelcome consequence for 
holding to PCT. As a result, multiple occupancy too fails as a response to the 
reduplication/fission objection. 
A third reply is to argue for psychological continuity with a “no-branching 
clause”. This strategy, most notably defended by Sydney Shoemaker,93 says that one is 
justified in considering one‟s numerical identity preserved by a psychological criterion as 
long as one has verified that no fissioning or reduplication has occurred. An act of 
identification for this view, then, is based on inductive reasoning. In considering a 
memory criterion, Shoemaker argues that, “if a person quasic-remembers an action from 
the inside then, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, he is entitled to regard it as 
more likely that the action was done by him than that it was done by any other person.”94 
Basing the identification of one‟s self over time on extrinsic empirical information has 
difficulties that will be explored in the next section, but at this point let us at least say that 
it is an odd consequence of the view that whether or not I persist depends on something 
other than just the relations I have to an individual in the past.  
A related strategy for dealing with the double transplant and reduplication cases is 
the “closest-continuer view,” most ably defended by Robert Nozick.95 According to 
Nozick, “[t]he closest continuer view holds that y at t2 is the same person as x at t1 only if, 
first, y‟s properties at t2 stem from, grow out of, are causally dependent on x‟s properties 
at t1 and, second there is no other z at t2 that stands in a closer (or as close) relationship to 
x at t1 than y at t2 does.”
96
 In other words, what allows one to assert that an individual has 
persisted through a certain transplant case is the evidentially-based conclusion that there 
is a candidate for being that same person that more closely approximates the original 
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person than any other candidate. This close approximation could mean psychological 
continuity, but it could also mean bodily continuity or some mixed account. For example, 
the original Brown/Brownson scenario is a case in which Brown survives and is 
transplanted because there are no better or other equally good candidates for being the 
same Brown. But if the original Brown were to have only one hemisphere removed, 
while the other remained in tact and functioning within Brown‟s body, and bodily 
continuity had any weight whatsoever, the transplanted half functioning in Robinson‟s 
body could not be the original Brown because the best candidate still exists as Brown‟s 
original functioning body.  
Still, the potency of the fission objection is that such procedures could produce 
two equal candidates for being the original person. It is a function of the closest continuer 
view that any cases of actually existing equal candidates eliminates both from 
candidacy,
97
 but Nozick leaves room for its application to certain overlapping scenarios. 
For example, consider a case of double transplant in which Brown, on the verge of death, 
retains his left cerebral hemisphere, but allows his right cerebral hemisphere to be 
transplanted to the younger, healthier Robinson body. Even though the hemisphere in 
Robinson‟s body will be sure to greatly outlive its counterpart, it appears that we have a 
case in which Brown‟s identity dies with his body. The only thing keeping Robinson 
from being Brown, let us say, is the three hours in which the left hemisphere was retained 
in Brown‟s body.  
Nozick suggests that it would be “unfair for a person to be doomed by an echo of 
his former self,” and he seems to want to leave room for a closest continuer account 
based on the post-transplant duration of competing candidates.
98
 Those candidates that 
only exist for a short amount of time would not be considered equal to those whose 
duration appears more certain. A closest continuer view might then argue that Brown‟s 
identity “jumps” to the hemisphere in the younger Robinson body once the dying Brown 
succumbs to his illness, or that the promise of the right hemisphere‟s survival beyond the 
death of the left hemisphere allows us to say that Brown‟s identity is transferred to 
Robinson‟s body at the very moment of the double transplant. While he does not 
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explicitly advocate this duration-criterion himself, Nozick argues that equal candidates 
are possible, and in that event he turns to the Parfitian thesis in which a double transplant 
should not be viewed as harshly as death.  
Disregarding his Parfitian retreat, Nozick‟s closest-continuer account is similar to 
Shoemaker‟s no-branching clause in that an assertion of identity over time depends 
necessarily on facts external to the candidate‟s relation to the original person. In 
Shoemaker‟s case, one must simply provide evidence that there are no other candidates, 
and for Nozick‟s account, one must first determine the degree of similarity between other 
candidates and the original person before one can determine one‟s own eligibility. This 
extrinsic facts stipulation as a reply to the fission and reduplication objections will be 
considered largely as one thesis in the following section and the absurdity of its 
entailments will be demonstrated. 
1.2.3 Identity and Extrinsic Facts 
As a restriction not only for personal identity, but identity in general, David 
Wiggins insists that the conditions of an entity‟s persistence over time are such that the 
fact of persistence must rely solely on the relation between a later instance of that entity 
(b) and its past self (a). Relations that other objects (c, etc) may have to a past stage of 
that entity are irrelevant. Wiggins calls this “the only a and b condition”.99 The 
motivation for such a rule becomes clear when we consider a famous philosophical 
problem, “The Ship of Theseus”.100 In this thought experiment, we are to imagine that 
Theseus‟ weathered ship is worn and needs repairs. Over a period of a year, each of the 
weathered planks of the ship are gradually removed and replaced by newer, stronger 
pieces, which in turn are arranged in the exact same configuration as the pieces they have 
replaced. Following Hobbes‟ formulation,101 let us also assume that the old weathered 
pieces of the ship are gathered together by some collector and he arranges those pieces in 
the exact same configuration they were in before.  
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Based on these facts, we can examine three possible scenarios. In the first 
scenario the original ship has its parts gradually replaced and the old parts are discarded. 
In the second, the removed parts are re-configured into a qualitatively identical ship and 
we thus have two candidates for the ship of Theseus. In the third scenario, the parts of the 
old ship are removed and reconstructed into an exactly similar ship, but the old ship never 
replaces these parts and ceases to exist with its deconstruction. The reconstructed ship 
would be the only remaining candidate.  
In order to formulate Wiggins‟ objection, it is not necessary to decide on the 
difficult question of which ship is the ship of Theseus in the second scenario, but let us 
for the sake of argument say that the old ship which has undergone gradual part 
replacement is the best candidate for the original ship.
102
 A closest-continuer theory 
applied to the ship of Theseus would say that in the first scenario a lack of competition 
makes the ship with gradual part replacement identical to the ship prior to that shuffling 
of parts. Likewise, in the second scenario, assuming that it is still the best candidate, the 
ship with gradual replacement is identical to the old ship. In the third scenario, however, 
the ship with gradual replacement does not exist, so the best candidate for the old ship is 
the reconstructed ship with old parts. As a result, in the third scenario the reconstructed 
ship is a good enough candidate to hold the identity of the original ship.  
In the second scenario the reconstructed ship would be a good enough candidate if 
it were not for the existence of the ship with gradual part replacement. We thus have an 
example in which the relation between a later entity and its past self is thwarted by the 
relation that another entity has to that same past self. As Wiggins states, based on what 
we know about the third scenario, in scenario two  
we could walk up to the antiquarian‟s relic [the reconstructed ship], seen 
as a candidate to be Theseus‟ ship, and say that, but for the existence of its 
rival, i.e. the distinct coincidence-candidate that is the constantly 
maintained working ship plying once yearly to Delos [the ship with 
gradual part replacement], it would have veritably coincided as a ship with 
Theseus‟ original ship.103  
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“But,” Wiggins continues, “the idea that in that case it would have been Theseus‟ very 
ship seems to be absurd.
104
  
Harold Noonan remarks that Wiggin‟s objection is not quite accurate, but that it 
can be adapted slightly to maintain its force.
105
 It is not the case that were it not for the 
ship with gradual part replacement, then the reconstructed ship would have been the ship 
of Theseus. Rather, the reconstructed ship qua lesser candidate would not have existed at 
all, and in its place would be the original ship qua reconstructed ship. And the fact that 
one thing can owe its very existence to the existence of a competitor is surely absurd, 
especially without any kind of a spatially-based causal interaction between the two. As 
Katherine Hawley puts it, closest-continuer views must necessarily admit to “noncausal 
counterfactual correlations between distinct individuals.”106 The existence of a rival ship 
can change the very identity of the ship next to it without it exerting any kind of causal 
influence. Additionally, Noonan indicates, the closest-continuer theory would have to say 
that two exactly similar processes can manufacture two different things. In scenarios two 
and three, the project of reconstructing the ship can be done using the exact same 
materials, the exact same workers, in the exact same location and the exact same time, 
and they would still manufacture different ships in the two cases.  
Applying Wiggins‟, Noonan‟s, and Hawley‟s observations to an explicit case of 
personal identity, recall the above case in which Brown‟s left hemisphere is left intact 
while the right hemisphere is placed in Robinson‟s body. Were it not for Brown‟s 
retention of the left hemisphere, the right hemisphere functioning in Robinson‟s body 
would appear to be Brown. But for the closest-continuer view, in this case it cannot be 
Brown, so it must still be Robinson or perhaps a third person, Rogers. According to 
Noonan‟s formulation of the objection, if it were not for the functional left cerebral 
hemisphere, then Rogers would not even exist. In his place would just be Brown. Rogers 
could be said then to owe Brown a gracious thank you for retaining that other 
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hemisphere, even for a few weeks. For if Brown‟s left hemisphere would have failed 
during the operation, then Rogers would never have come into existence. 
In addition to its seeming metaphysical counter-intuitiveness, there are further 
epistemic problems in advocating a closest-continuer view or a no-branching clause. Both 
Nozick and Shoemaker stipulate that psychological continuity must include a causal 
requirement.
107
 For Nozick specifically, this means that psychological duplicates created 
through independent, random processes do not count as genuine candidates.
108
 Despite 
this requirement, there are plausible scenarios involving unorthodox, but causal, relations 
nonetheless, in which it would be next to impossible to determine one‟s eligibility or even 
if a branching has occurred.  
If we grant that psychological continuity is preserved through brain-state 
transfers, and it is allowed that the data transfer be mediated by computers, we can 
imagine a modern case in which the data was made available to millions of such 
machines through internet communication. If millions of instantiation-capable computers 
received my “psychological data” mid-transfer, in order to confirm a no-branching clause 
I would have to verify, post-transfer, that none of the computers had successfully 
transferred my psychology to another body other than my own successful local trial. If 
even one was successful, I would not be identical to the person whose memories, beliefs, 
desires and intentions I instantiate. Likewise, for the closest continuer view, I would have 
to investigate every offshoot (if there were any) to determine the degree of closeness it 
has to the original “me”. If we do not accept Nozick‟s suggestion that longevity be 
included in the criteria for candidacy, it is assuredly plausible that during one‟s search for 
other successful transfers, all of the transfer recipients besides myself may have already 
perished. In this case I would have to determine whether these duplicates were ever 
during their existence psychologically equal to me. This information may quite possibly 
be irretrievable. Notably, epistemic problems arise for Nozick even if he accepts the 
longevity requirement. For if two psychologically equivalent candidates exist presently, 
but unbeknownst to either, one will die before the other, no one would presently be in the 
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position to determine which candidate is at this moment identical to the pre-fission or 
pre-reduplication individual. 
Admittedly, cerebrum transplants are less epistemically problematic than brain-
state transfers, but similar cases are possible. Imagine that during a double transplant one 
of your cerebral hemispheres is carefully snatched by a thief and preserved in a way that 
makes the organ viable for at least a few hours. Let us also say that this thief carrying 
your left hemisphere absconds to a faraway country and his intentions are unknown. The 
person who awakens with the right hemisphere will think he is identical to the pre-fission 
individual, but he would not be justified in that claim until the thief is hunted down and 
the fate (even the past fate, as it might have been initially successful but failed shortly 
thereafter) of the missing hemisphere is determined. Based on the above cases, it is 
apparent that stipulating a no-branching or closest-continuer clause would so complicate 
the process of determining identity that even everyday identifications would seem 
plausibly open to false ascription. This is due to their reliance on extrinsic facts for 
identification, and if such cases appear at all absurd (which it seems they do), we may 
have good reason to follow Wiggins‟ intrinsic identity requirement. 
1.2.4 Burying PCT with the Hope of Resurrection 
Psychological Continuity Theory (PCT) is perhaps the most popular account of 
personal identity, and in response to its objections, it has spawned numerous variations. 
In this chapter I have included what I consider to be the main historical formulations of 
PCT in order to argue for its general implausibility as a whole. I admit that the objections 
featured above more ably debunk some formulations than others. For example, the entire 
first half of this chapter was dedicated to three specific objections to the most common 
psychological criterion, memory. I have shown that intransitivity, circularity and 
backward causation are grave difficulties for memory theorists, and that they can only be 
avoided by espousing some counter-intuitive, non-identity preserving relation or 
surrendering to a more physically-based account. How other theories of personal identity 
fare against some of these problems will be investigated in later chapters.  
In the second half of my first chapter I introduced possible arguments in support 
of some form of PCT, which may be used even if appeals to memory as the sole criterion 
fail. In challenging the PCT theorist‟s intuitions I included the well-known problems of 
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fission and reduplication, which, it should be noted, must necessarily be addressed by any 
account of personal identity, though it is a particularly strong objection to PCT. It seems 
that the only possible way to save psychological continuity in light of the problem of 
fission is to advocate some form of a no-branching or closest-continuer clause. But if that 
response requires an appeal to extrinsic facts for identification, then there are a whole 
host of difficulties and absurdities that follow. In that regard I hope to have critically 
challenged the appeal to brain-state transfers as a plausible case of personal identity over 
time.  
I have, however, featured physical brain transplant thought experiments for a 
more positive reason. As will be seen in Chapter two, some animalists are willing to 
argue that a whole brain transplant, including brain stem, would be the transplantation of 
the individual. A distinction must then be made between cerebrum and whole brain 
transplants. In sections 3.3 - 3.3.2 I will further investigate the possibility of personal 
survival across cerebrum transplants. Based on the criticisms outlined in this chapter, 
such a view would have to maintain a notion of the intrinsicness of identity (or at least be 
able to avoid the problems of extrinsic identity), and the theory of hylomorphism may 
have the resources to do so. In concluding this chapter, then, I hope to have elucidated the 
many issues that a PCT advocate must face in order to be consistent, which should be 
enough to encourage the reader to look elsewhere for the possibility of more capable 
alternatives. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
BIOLOGICAL CONTINUITY THEORY 
2.1 Animals, Bodies and Too Many Thinkers 
The biological account of personal identity, or animalism, makes two important 
claims.
109
 The first is that we, you and I, are most fundamentally biological organisms, 
members of the species Homo Sapiens. This is not to say that we are constituted by 
animals, uniquely related to animals, or that biological continuity only traces some form 
of Parfitian concern. Instead, we are numerically identical to a human organism such that 
at any time the organism persists, that is where we are to be found. The second animalist 
claim is that “psychological continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for a human 
animal to persist through time.”110 As Eric Olson explains, psychological continuity is not 
necessary because an animal can survive in a persistent vegetative state even though the 
capacity for psychological features has been irretrievably lost.
111
 As long as the organism 
maintains homeostasis and continues its metabolic activities, psychology is irrelevant. 
 The insufficiency of the psychological criterion for biological persistence can be 
demonstrated by considering the cerebrum transplant cases mentioned above.
112
 Recall 
that if my cerebrum, which houses my higher mental functions, is removed from my 
cranium and placed in the cranium of another human animal, the displacement of my 
psychology seems to suggest that I have been moved during the procedure. But let us also 
assume that my brain stem, which coordinates the more basic biological activities, is not 
transported but left functioning in my body. My cerebrumless body would still, without 
interruption, continue its life processes. According to the animalist, because no organism 
has been moved during the procedure in the cerebrum transplant thought experiment, my 
identity is preserved in the cerebrumless animal rather than the relocated cerebrum. The 
transplant intuition is therefore false and misleading.
113
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Crucial to the animalist position is an account of biological continuity, and the 
traditional feature utilized by animalists is the notion of an organism‟s “life.” 
Interestingly, John Locke himself has one of the best historical analyses of the persistence 
of organisms. He says in considering how an oak tree differs from inanimate objects that 
“the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united, the other such a 
disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization of those 
parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment.”114 And furthermore the oak  
continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, 
though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united 
to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that 
sort of plants.
115
 
 More recently, Peter van Inwagen bases the continuity of an organism on a 
continuing homeodynamic event such that 
If the activity of the xs [constituent particles] at t1 constitutes or results 
from a life, and the activity of the ys [other candidates for constituency] at 
t2 constitutes or results from a life, then the organism the xs compose at t1 
is the organism the ys compose at t2 if and only if the life that the activity 
of the xs at t1 constitutes or results from is the life that the activity of the ys 
at t2 constitutes or results from.
116 
Underlying van Inwagen‟s formula is a requirement of spatio-temporal continuity, but 
importantly this requirement is not always sufficient for a continued life. To see why, in 
the next section I will offer an analysis of the important distinctions between the more 
historically defended bodily criterion and the more recently popular biological approach. 
Upon establishing a firmer understanding of the account, section 2.1.2 will be dedicated 
to Eric Olson‟s famous argument for animalism. Throughout section 2.2 I will consider 
problems for the biological approach which will ultimately lead into my own positive 
account in chapter three. 
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2.1.1 Bodily Continuity and the Biological Account of Personal Identity 
 Traditionally, the main competitor to the psychological continuity view of 
personal identity has been the bodily account or the bodily criterion. Bodily criterialists, 
few though they are117, often insist that psychological continuity is not sufficient for the 
preservation of one‟s identity over time, and argue thenceforth that there need be a spatio-
temporal requirement.118 In making such a suggestion, it is assumed that there exists some 
material entity, some hunk of matter to which we may be identical. Advocates of a bodily 
criterion, such as Bernard Williams, devote most of their work to demonstrating the 
inadequacy of other views, and as a result, the problem of precisely defining their own 
account remains largely untouched. Bodily continuity theorists seem to rely on a 
presumed common-sense understanding of the term „human body‟. In this section I will 
attempt (much as Olson has119) to outline possible formulations of a bodily criterion, and 
argue that in four important ways the biological or animalist account is distinct from (and 
in many ways an improvement upon) the more traditional bodily criterion. 
 It is a widely accepted biological fact that organisms regularly shuffle their parts 
through normal metabolic processes.120 An animal (or plant, insect, etc.) takes in nutrients 
from the outside, retains certain particles such that some of them become a part of the 
organism itself, and expels unused or formerly used particles which it no longer needs. It 
is in fact necessary for an organism to do this in order to survive. It is also quite possible, 
based on a consistent metabolic shuffling, for an organism to have none of the same 
microscopic parts at two times in its history.121 Some ontological accounts of material 
objects might argue that no material thing can survive the complete replacement of all its 
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parts. For if the two stages of an entity share absolutely no parts, in what sense are they 
the same physical object? Mereological essentialists will take this suggestion a step 
further and argue that no material thing can survive the loss or exchange of any of its 
parts.122 The departure of one single particle would introduce a new and numerically 
distinct object. The first point of differentiation, then, between biological and strict bodily 
accounts could result from a bodily criterialist espousing either mereological essentialism 
or the thesis that a physical object cannot survive complete part replacement. If one‟s 
notion of bodily continuity requires either of these restrictions then it is incompatible with 
animalism. 
 In contrast to the ultra-conservativism of mereological essentialism, a bodily 
criterialist may favor a more liberal understanding of the phrase „human body‟. Let us 
assume that a body can survive complete part replacement as long as it is gradual. Using 
the term „body‟ in the loose sense, it may also be possible to consider an inorganic human 
figure a body. From these two premises, some bodily continuity theorists may conclude 
that a body made up of organic constituents (one‟s current body) could be numerically 
identical to a completely inorganic version of that body at a later time, as long as the 
organic parts were replaced gradually and there is consistent spatio-temporal 
continuity.123 After all, the bodies of some real individuals seem to include things such as 
pacemakers and artificial limbs. The inorganic part replacement thought experiment just 
asks us to consider an expansion of this real occurrence so as to include human bodies 
entirely made up of artificial parts. Contrary to this formulation of the bodily criterion, 
the animalist is committed to the idea that each part of an organism must be caught up in 
the event of its biological life. An inorganic part such as an artificial limb is not 
subsumed by the organism‟s life processes due most evidently to its lack of participation 
in metabolic activities. As Olson states, “[i]f you cut off an animal‟s limb and replace it 
with an inorganic prosthesis, the animal just gets smaller and has something inorganic 
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attached to it.”124 Complete inorganic part replacement would therefore destroy the 
animal, and thus end one‟s existence. Olson admits that it might be possible to replace 
microscopic pieces of a human animal with inorganic parts and have them still be part of 
the animal, but each replacement would have to be small enough to be caught up in the 
larger organism‟s life processes.125 Insofar as a bodily account allows for large scale 
inorganic part replacement, that much is it opposed to a biological account. 
 A third distinction between a bodily account and animalism is the difference in 
categorization of the hunk of matter which is left after an animal‟s life processes cease. 
When the event of an organism‟s life ceases, in all but the most violent deaths, there is a 
material entity that seems to persist – the body. Where once there was the body of a 
living being, this apparently same body is now dead. If there is such an entity (some 
material body) that persists through the cessation of the animal‟s biological activities,126 
then according to the animalist account of personal identity, I cannot be identical to that 
thing, for I am essentially an organism, which is defined as an entity preserved by the 
continuation of its life. If the event of the life ceases to exist, then so do I. Some who 
argue for a bodily account of identity suppose that a human being can survive its own 
death as a corpse.127 This may be due to its physical continuity with our living body. But 
as Olson points out (following Wiggins), spatio-temporal continuity is only relevant for 
identity when considered under a substance sortal.128 There has to be a sense in which two 
spatio-temporally connected things are of the same kind. For animalists there is no 
substance sortal term shared by the animal and the corpse. They are of radically different 
kinds. I will discuss in more detail the animalist account of the dead body and the 
possibility of a “corpse problem” below, but for the moment it is enough to emphasize 
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that if a bodily account says that the body persists through death, then this is another 
important difference between the two accounts. 
 The fourth difference between bodily and biological accounts is the bodily 
account‟s reliance on a principle of identity for masses and hunks of matter. Say, for 
example, that your arm becomes completely detached from the rest of you. Has the same 
body persisted through the excision? If not, then we have an immediate distinction 
between the two accounts, this one similar to that mentioned in the first. If the body does 
survive, we might extend the example to include a loss of both arms and both legs, and 
then proceed to ask the same question. Inevitably the inquiry arises, at what point does 
subtracting parts no longer result in the same body? Is it after half of the parts are 
removed? The arbitrariness of any supposed solution to this problem becomes most clear 
in considering Derek Parfit‟s famous physical spectrum example.129 Imagine that 
gradually over time each of your parts are replaced by new ones.130 When only one 
percent of your parts are replaced, it seems obvious to say that it is still the same body. 
On the other end of the spectrum, it may seem just as obvious that a complete 
replacement of one hundred percent of your parts results in a completely different body. 
Parfit‟s question, like ours, is: at what point in the spectrum did a numerically distinct 
body come to be? If at fifty-one percent exchange there is a new body in place, then it 
would follow that from fifty to fifty-one percent, the exchange of one single particle is 
responsible for the onset of an entirely different material object, though nothing else may 
appear to change. And if the bodily continuity theorist holds that we are numerically 
identical to our bodies, then one single particle has ended our existence and caused 
another human being to be.  
 The animalist of course has a response to this problem. He need not rely on 
stipulating a certain amount of physical continuity. The questions the animalist would ask 
are: Is the human being still alive? Is it still the same life? If the answer to both of these 
questions is „yes,‟ then the animalist has his response to Parfit‟s physical spectrum. There 
may be a certain precise point in which taking a single particle destroys the animal, but 
this would have to result in the cessation of its biological life, an event perhaps 
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significant enough to warrant the suggestion of substantial change. The portrayal of this 
thought experiment as a problem for the bodily continuity theorist not faced by the 
animalist demonstrates the final important distinction between the two views. By 
considering these four issues, I have given animalism a fuller exposition so as to avoid 
initial concerns and confusions. It is with this greater understanding of the view that I 
now turn to arguments which aim to indicate its superiority over its psychological rivals. 
2.1.2 The Thinking Animal Argument 
Eric Olson‟s case for animalism depends almost exclusively on what he has called 
“The Thinking-Animal Argument.” His defense of the argument and the discussion it has 
elicited have substantially changed the personal identity debate, and while it is not 
essential for the animalist position,
131
 it may very well be the best argument against 
alternative accounts. I include it here as an additional objection to psychological 
continuity, one that points explicitly to a biological conclusion. 
The premises for the argument (as taken from Olson‟s “An Argument for 
Animalism”) are as follows: 
  (1) There is a human animal sitting in your chair.  
  (2) The human animal sitting in your chair is thinking.  
  (3) You are the thinking being sitting in your chair. The one and only  
  thinking being sitting in your chair is none other than you.132 
The conclusion that Olson reaches from these premises, and that which follows 
logically, is that you are that same animal. His argument is “deceptively simple”,133 and 
taken at face value there does not seem to be much to it. But the real strength of Olson‟s 
account is his elaboration and defense of each of the premises. In investigating his 
argument, then, I will explore how one could deny each of the premises and consider 
Olson‟s replies. 
 The first premise could be rejected by denying that animals exist at all. For if we 
are willing to grant that such things as animals do exist, then it would seem to be apparent 
that the breathing, perspiring, metabolizing thing in your chair is an animal. If one were 
an idealist, in that one believed that no material things at all existed, then premise one 
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would be false. But Olson is unwilling to grant plausibility to this suggestion and I will 
follow him in that regard.134 Perhaps more convincingly one could hold a mereological 
essentialist stance, and based on the metabolic shuffling discussed above, this would 
make impossible the continuation of any single biological entity. But importantly, a 
mereological essentialist would also have to deny that we could be anything like what the 
psychological continuity theorist wants to suggest we are.135 For many PCT advocates 
would argue that we are bundles of psychological features, such as memories, beliefs or 
intentions, but none would (I assume) suggest that we are a stagnant bundle which never 
changes any of its parts. Therefore, the first premise seems to survive scrutiny. 
 The second premise could be rejected by denying that, even though animals exist, 
and the material thing presently in your chair is an animal, it is not thinking because 
animals do not or cannot think. Olson‟s reply to this objection is to push the intuition into 
the implicit dualism which motivates it. Consider the fact that the normal human animal 
has an elaborate functioning brain which it uses for the storage and computation of 
information. If any organism could be capable of thought, a human being would seem to 
be the best candidate. Inasmuch as human beings are the best-equipped (among animals, 
and perhaps even among all material objects), denying the capacity for thought to human 
animals seems to prohibit any organism from having that capacity. Furthermore, if no 
organism can think, it seems difficult to suppose that any material thing at all could think. 
The only place left for thought in one‟s ontology would be in an immaterial subject. In 
pushing this line, Olson seems to follow Daniel Dennett‟s suggestion that “dualism is not 
a serious view to contend with, but rather a cliff over which to push one's opponents.”136 
And while this is not a very sound assumption,137 most psychological continuity theorists 
seem to want to avoid dualism if at all possible.138 
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 Shoemaker‟s response to the second premise is to say that animals do not think 
because, based on a functionalist theory of mind, they have the wrong persistence 
conditions.139 According to Shoemaker‟s formulation of functionalism, “it is of the 
essence of a mental state to be caused in certain ways, and to produce in conjunction with 
other mental states, certain effects (behaviour or other mental states).”140 In other words, a 
thought that it will rain is defined by its tendency to bring about either further thoughts 
(such as regret at the inevitable cancellation of an outdoor event) or actions (such as 
grabbing an umbrella). Shoemaker continues:  
  But of course, it is in conjunction with other mental states of the same  
  person that a mental state produces the effect it does; and its immediate  
  effects, those the having of which is definitive of its being the mental state 
  it is, will be states (or behaviour) on the part of the very same person who  
  had the mental state in question.141 
 Shoemaker‟s suggestion is that a mental state had by an individual can only 
produce the appropriate effects (by which it is defined) in that very same individual. So if 
the thought that it will rain produces the effect that I pick up an umbrella, then it is the 
same individual who had the thought and performed the action. Recalling Shoemaker‟s 
famous brain-state transfer thought experiment,142 the fact that my informed body 
duplicate‟s actions are caused by my previous mental states leads to the conclusion that 
he and I are the same individual. But between us there is no biological continuity. (It is 
not necessary that there be any physical continuity at all). Because I am a person rather 
than an animal, because I am the thinker of my thoughts, and because the only bearer of a 
mental state can be that same individual who experiences its effects, an animal, according 
to Shoemaker, is not a proper bearer of mental states. Therefore, he concludes, the animal 
cannot think. 
 The weakness in Shoemaker‟s response is, I think, in the claim that mental states 
can only have causal relevance to the same individual who instantiates them. The case of 
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fission certainly undermines this claim, and that is precisely why Shoemaker resorts to 
his ad hoc no-branching clause. We also considered a counterexample to his claim when 
discussing a patient‟s memory of an event being causally relevant to a hypnotist‟s 
actions.143 As was demonstrated, the only way to respond to that objection was to talk in a 
circle. Perhaps Olson puts the problem best when he asks: 
  Why must the characteristic causes and effects of a thing‟s mental states  
  always be states of that thing and no other? Why should anyone who isn‟t  
  already a psychological-continuity theorist accept that? For someone to be  
  hungry is at least in part for him to be in a state typically caused by  
  someone‟s having low blood sugar, and apt to combine with someone‟s  
  belief that there is food before him to cause someone to eat. Why must it  
  be the same being all four times? Why couldn‟t my being hungry cause  
  someone else to eat in the way that it ordinarily causes me to?144 
Shoemaker just assumes this premise, offering no real support that does not also require a 
general defense of PCT. Similar to the conclusion reached by the circularity objection, we 
find here that Shoemaker‟s notion of a causal requirement leaves his account lacking. 
And as a result, the only way to really deny premise two of the thinking-animal argument 
is to embrace substance dualism, which may or may not be a view worth taking seriously. 
 The third premise of Olson‟s Thinking-Animal argument can be challenged by 
granting that there are actually two things thinking all of your thoughts. As mentioned 
above, both Lewis and Noonan take this route.145 In responding to their positions, Olson 
lists three main problems associated with “cohabitation” or “multiple-occupancy” 
views.146 The first is the overcrowding problem. This means that the cohabitation view 
must admit that in the place of every human being, where we normally think there is only 
one individual, there are actually two entities thinking each thought (usually a person or 
psychological continuer and an animal). Anticipating a cohabitation reply long before 
Olson‟s formulation of the argument, Chisholm describes the problem: “Isn‟t this 
multiplying thinkers beyond necessity? If I want my dinner, does it follow that two of us 
want my dinner? Or does the thinking substance want its dinner and not mine?”147  
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 The second problem for the cohabitation view is epistemic. If there are in fact two 
thinkers in your chair you ought to wonder which one of them you are. It may seem 
obvious that you are the person and not the animal. But if each thought that you might 
have is equally shared by the other thinker, then any reason you would have for believing 
that you are the person is also had by the animal. One of the co-located thinkers is 
incorrect in believing that he or she is the person, and it seems you can never know for 
sure that it is not you. The third problem Olson calls the problem of dual personhood. 
Defining the term „person‟ is, as described above, outside of the scope of the personal 
ontology debate, but if we very tentatively consider a person anything that can think 
about itself as itself (roughly, Locke‟s definition) then the problem becomes clear 
enough. The psychological continuer in your chair certainly does this and that is why it is 
often referred to as the person. But the animal has all of the same thoughts that the person 
does according to the cohabitation view. It seems to reflect on its actions just as the 
person might. So why is it not too a person? If the animal is a person, then the PCT 
theorist would have to admit that some persons have biological persistence conditions, 
and this allowance would seem to undermine the whole project.148  
 Additionally, David Hershenov points to a fourth problem for the collocationist, 
which he calls the “false self-ascription problem.”149 If you, qua person, believe that you 
will be moved with your transplanted cerebrum then your belief will be true. And in so 
believing this statement the animal in your chair believes it as well. But this belief is 
clearly false for the animal. Similar to the epistemic problem, if there is at least one 
thinker in your chair who believes falsely that he or she will be transported in a cerebrum 
transplant scenario, and both of you have the exact same thoughts, the veridicality of the 
transplant intuition is in serious doubt. 
 To soften the apparent counterintuitiveness of multiple occupancy and to solve the 
difficulties above, Lewis and Noonan have offered linguistic solutions to the too many 
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thinkers problem.150 Lewis suggests that though there are two entities in your chair when 
counting by strict numerical identity, identity is not the only way of counting.151 Working 
within a temporal stage theory of personal identity, he argues that we need not count by 
perduring continuers or whole temporally extended series. We can instead count by 
temporal stages themselves, wherein each thought is counted only as one. This, Lewis 
remarks, will correspond to the results of our counting in everyday speech, and the 
underlying multiple occupancy is no cause for concern as long as we stick to counting 
more practically when it matters.152 Although Lewis seems to make room for our 
everyday assertions about the number of thinkers in your chair, he has not really solved 
the problem. Saying that we can talk about there being only one thinker hardly makes the 
fact that there really are two (or more) any easier to accept. Also, as Olson points out, this 
linguistic hypothesis fails to reply to the epistemic problem. Even if we can talk about 
there being only one thinker, the fact that there really are two makes an issue out of 
which one holds our identity. 
 From the false self-ascription and epistemic problems we gather that if at some 
time both the animal and the person in my chair think the thought, “I am a psychological 
continuer,” then one of them has uttered a falsehood and I have no way of determining 
which one of them I am. Harold Noonan suggests that the possibility of false self-
ascription can be eliminated if we abandon the assumption that all „I‟ statements are 
reflexive in the way we normally take them to be.153 If we accept that the utterer and 
referent of „I‟ statements need not be the same entity, then the thinking-animal problem 
can be mitigated. The animal who thinks, “I am a psychological continuer” does not 
speak falsely because the referent of „I‟ in his statement is not himself qua animal but the 
person whose thoughts he shares.154 Essentially his thought just means, “The person 
whose thoughts I share is a psychological continuer.” The person qua person who thinks 
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this same thought can refer to herself using „I‟ and thus her statement is true as well, only 
non-derivatively. Noonan also hopes to avoid the epistemic problem with this linguistic 
exercise. He argues that I can know that I am the person and not the animal because by 
definition the person is the only entity that can refer to itself using „I‟ statements.155 With 
the further premise that I am the non-derivative thinker of my thoughts, it follows 
necessarily that I am the person. So even with the acceptance of two thinkers for every 
thought, if Noonan‟s “personal-pronoun revisionism”156 is successful then all other 
relevant problems are solved. 
 Though Noonan‟s account is consistent, it appears to compile counterintuitive 
consequences. He admits that he has not rejected the overcrowding problem and as a 
result there remain two thinkers in your chair. It also requires us to accept that some 
entities (human animals) not only fail to refer to themselves when they use personal 
pronouns, but they fail necessarily. It is impossible for them to do otherwise. When 
giving a reason for why animals cannot refer to themselves Noonan seems to suggest that 
it is because they are not persons, and only persons can refer to themselves with personal 
pronouns.157 But here Noonan has argued in a circle, and Olson catches him in the act. 
Noonan vacuously asserts that the animal cannot refer to itself because it is not a person 
and it is not a person because it cannot refer to itself. Olson remarks that “[w]e might as 
well say that there is no reason why animals aren‟t people. But then there is no reason to 
suppose that the animal associated with you refers to you rather than to itself when it says 
„I‟.”158 Even if Noonan can offer an informative account of persons that does not include 
animals,159 Olson argues that it would have to concede that a rational animal with all of 
the same thoughts as a person could still fail to be a person herself.160 And as a necessary 
consequence of Noonan‟s position it seems only to add to the running list of 
disconcerting elements. 
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 In the above, by including many of the replies and responses drawn from Eric 
Olson‟s original argument, in addition to a presentation of the argument itself, I have 
attempted to demonstrate the strength and cogency of his position. I see it as a formidable 
challenge to alternatives, and even as I proceed to defend a non-animalist account of 
personal identity in chapter three, I do so with the understanding that it must be 
reconciled with Olson‟s argument. But before moving on to that stage I will include in 
the second half of this chapter some popular problems for the biological account of 
personal identity which may point the reader towards the alternatives I will later explore.                 
2.2 Problems for a Biological Account 
 My first task in arousing concerns for the animalist is to briefly consider how the 
position fares with regard to some of the problems posed for the PCT theorist. I will 
begin with the intransitivity objection. Recall that for Parfit‟s and Lewis‟s accounts the 
transitivity of numerical identity was violated by granting varying degrees of 
connectedness between stages of an individual‟s career. Any psychological account based 
on the continuity of memories will fail because there is no single aspect that persists over 
time, be it a continuing relation or a distinct simple entity.  
 A biological account seems to provide such a persisting aspect in the form of an 
organism‟s life. As mentioned above, Locke insists that an oak tree “continues to be the 
same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to 
new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant”.161 Van Inwagen likewise 
considers an organism to persist as long as its parts continue to engage in the 
homeodynamic event of its life. But inevitably the question arises, what is a life? Is it 
simply a relation had between the parts of an organism? If it is just a relation between 
spatial parts, then in order to preserve the transitivity of identity over time each stage in 
an organism‟s career must be related to those temporally contiguous to it by the same 
relation. This much is present in Locke‟s and van Inwagen‟s definitions. But what must 
also be the case is that the life-relation cannot admit of degrees, or else it is susceptible to 
the same numerical intransitivity objection that befell PCT.  
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 In other words, the animalist must argue that the life of an organism at a certain 
time is just as much its life as at any other time of its career.162 Even in the midst of 
disease and dying the life-relation itself cannot be said to “wane.” There may be fewer 
particles engaged in the event of an organism‟s life between stages of its career but the 
relation itself cannot weaken. For if the life-relation just is an identity relation then two 
stages of an organism‟s career having between themselves a greater continuity of life than 
that between two other stages would lead to the undesirable result that the first two stages 
are more identical to one another than the two other stages of the same organism. This 
would violate the transitivity of identity. In order to avoid “degrees of identity” it seems 
to me that the animalist would have to argue that the life-relation has no parts or 
components. If certain components of the life-relation are lacking between two stages of 
an organism‟s career then the animalist would be stuck with a non-equivalent relation 
over time and a return to intransitivity. More needs to be said by animalists concerning 
the simplicity of the life-relation, but my initial intuition is that they may be able to 
accept my suggestion without damaging the account. If nothing else, it seems the 
animalist has more options in avoiding the objection than the PCT theorist. 
 The notion of an organism‟s life leads to the second objection I will consider in 
this section, circularity. Earlier I accused Shoemaker of arguing in a circle when he 
attempted to include an informative causal requirement for psychological continuity. In 
order to state that a memory was caused in the appropriate way, it seemed necessary for 
him to make reference to some sort of physical continuity, which if spelled out, reveals a 
reliance on a criterion of personal identity already in place. The biological account, if it is 
to be an improvement upon PCT must respond to its own challenge of circularity. 
 The intuitive concept of an organism‟s life allows the animalist to explain the 
general conditions which must be met for an individual to persist over time. But there is 
the deeper question of what distinguishes one life from another. Diachronically what may 
distinguish lives (and consequently, the organisms themselves) is some sort of temporal 
discontinuity. It may be impossible for a life to stop and then start again while continuing 
                                                          
162
 I am not suggesting here that the animalist make any kind of moral claim regarding the value of lives. 
As the following sentences should indicate, I mean only to insist on ontological consistency.  
 55 
to be the same life.163 Synchronically there is the tendency to distinguish lives based on 
spatial discontiguity. While spatial contiguity may be a necessary criterion for the 
singularity of a life, it does not appear to be sufficient. One need only consider the 
example of an intestinal parasite, which though seemingly within the spatial boundaries 
of the organism actually participates in its own distinct life. Van Inwagen also points out 
the inadequacy of spatial contiguity or “contact” by indicating that a handshake in no way 
joins two human organisms into a single life despite their apparent connectedness.164 How 
then can the animalist differentiate lives?  
 Eric Olson recognizes that without a proper answer to this question, the biological 
account risks falling into circularity. He says, 
[I]s there any way to find out whether some animal‟s life is your life 
without first knowing whether that animal is you? If not, the current 
proposal would be no better than this one: a person x picked out at one 
time and something y picked out at another time are identical just in case x 
and y are legally entitled to bear the same passport. While this may be 
true, it doesn‟t tell us anything about how to individuate people, because 
any evidence for the claim that x and y are entitled to carry the same 
passport would have to involve the claim that x is y.165 
In practice it seems that we tend to delineate lives based on the distinct organisms whose 
lives we are considering. But of course this would require a prior understanding of how 
one organism is distinguished from the next, which is precisely the point being discussed. 
Though Olson is aware of the problem, he fails to give any informative criteria for 
individuation, relying instead on the intuitive practicality of the process.166 Van Inwagen 
more or less passes the problem on by stating that “it is the business of biology to answer 
this question.” 167 He gives few if any of his own suggestions. But if Jack Wilson, another 
biological criterialist, is right in saying that “the biological literature on individuality 
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could itself use some philosophical tidying up”168 then there appears to be a rather large 
lacuna in the biological account. Hence, the challenge of circularity for animalism is not 
that the account is explicitly circular, but that it could very well fall into circularity if the 
individuation issue is not solved more resolutely. In that regard the animalist is already 
doing better than the PCT theorist, but I hope to have demonstrated that she may still 
have some cause for concern. 
2.2.1 The Death of an Animal and “The Corpse Problem” 
 In arguing for his position, Eric Olson presents another challenge for PCT 
accounts, similar to his thinking-animal quadrilemma, which he calls “The Fetus 
Problem”.169 According to most (if not all) PCT accounts, certain psychological features 
are essential to an individual‟s identity over time. I exist, and can only exist, when those 
features (or perhaps the capacities to demonstrate those features) are present. But 
consider the fact that the normal human fetus, or for that matter the normal human infant, 
fails to meet these psychological requirements. Does it follow that I was never a fetus or 
even an infant? Olson continues: 
  [S]uppose I came into being six or seven months after I was conceived,  
  when the normal course of fetal development produced the first mental  
  capacities worthy of the name – or a year or more after my birth, when the 
  normal course of infantile development produced those mental capacities  
  that distinguish people from non-people, such as rationality and self  
  consciousness. Suppose that the fetus my mother bore during that time  
  (and perhaps the infant my mother nursed) is numerically different from  
  me. What became of the infant?170 
 As Olson explains, the PCT theorist has only two options: either the fetus 
continues its existence as an entity coinciding with the person or it ceases to exist 
altogether.171 The former option would of course lead to the problems of cohabitation 
outlined above. The latter would entail that the fetus, a biological entity, ceases to exist at 
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the onset of psychological features. But why, asks Olson, “should a fetus perish simply 
because in the course of carrying out the program encoded in its genes, it (or rather its 
successor) came to be able to think? …That something should perish by virtue of gaining 
that ability is absurd.”172 Olson‟s conclusion is that each of us is numerically identical to a 
biological entity which started out as a fetus (or perhaps earlier) and grew into an adult. 
 Using insights gained from the fetus problem, W. R. Carter, who agrees with the 
conclusion above, has claimed that the form of the argument actually undermines Olson‟s 
expression of the biological account by introducing what he calls the “the dead person 
problem”173 (or for stylistic reasons what I shall henceforth refer to as the “corpse 
problem”). To understand the issue, recall that the persistence condition of an organism is 
said to be the continuation of its life. When the life processes of an organism dissipate, 
the organism itself ceases to exist. Olson says, “Roughly an organism dies when its life-
sustaining functions cease and cannot be restarted, or when its capacity to regulate those 
functions is destroyed.”174 Peter van Inwagen and Jack Wilson give similar definitions.175 
The puzzle that Carter presents to animalists who espouse the “termination thesis” is 
approximately the following176: if I have ceased to exist at the moment of death, what 
shall we say about the dead body which I have left behind? How was this body situated 
before I died? Did the same body, the same hunk of matter, exist throughout my career 
and survive my death? There seems to be, in all but the most violent deaths, some thing 
that persists, some body that once held my life and is now buried in the ground. If our 
intuitions are correct here, and there is a persisting body that survives my death, it follows 
from the termination thesis that it is numerically distinct from what I am. This is due to 
                                                          
172
 Ibid. 
173
 W. R. Carter, “Will I Be a Dead Person?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 59, No. 1 
(Mar. 1999): 167-171. 
174
 Olson, The Human Animal, 119. 
175
 Van Inwagen, Material Beings, 148-149; Jack Wilson, Biological Individuality, 89-99. This 
“Termination Thesis” is not to be confused with the claim that when an individual dies, he or she ceases to 
exist as a person or as a living thing. Rather, the termination thesis, as held by Olson, van Inwagen and 
others, says that when an individual dies, he or she ceases to exist simpliciter. There is no thing that the 
individual is identical to after death. See Fred Feldman, “The Termination Thesis,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, Vol. 24 (2000): 98-115 for a relevant discussion of this point. 
176
 W. R. Carter, “Will I Be a Dead Person?” 
 58 
the fact that the body can (seemingly) survive death, even when I, qua organism, have 
ceased to exist, and no single thing can have two sets of persistence conditions.   
 Carter then proposes a dilemma strikingly similar to that used in Olson‟s fetus 
argument: either the body existed throughout the organism‟s career as a spatially 
coinciding entity or at the cessation of life processes a dead body “popped” into 
existence. If we grant that the body has as one of its proper parts a human brain, then the 
first option would seem to leave the animalist with too many thinkers. Sydney Shoemaker 
uses the corpse argument to show that the animalist is no better off than the PCT theorist 
when considering the puzzles of coinciding entities.177 If it were necessary for the 
animalist to accept option one this would undermine the strength of Olson‟s thinking 
animal problem, and if the PCT theorist has any additional arguments in support of her 
own position, the animalist may find himself in a rather grave situation.  
 Carter, arguing from the other side of the debate, insists that option two is just as 
troublesome.178 If we were to film the death of a dying patient in a hospital, there would 
be a distinct point (according to the termination thesis) in which we could view the 
animal going out of existence. If we were to view the film in reverse it would likewise 
follow that we could watch the dead body (or the corpse) cease to exist. Carter continues: 
  In this (extraordinary) context we might ask: what becomes of Flan [the  
  dead body]? Suppose that our BV [Biological View] theorist replies that  
  Flan „perishes‟ when life emerges (on the backtracking film we are  
  viewing). Isn‟t this as implausible as supposing that (the fetus) Flem  
  perishes when thought emerges?179 
Carter thus criticizes the biological view for having the same sort of unexplained 
disappearances as PCT accounts. His solution is to deny the termination thesis and argue 
that we just are those persisting bodies all along. The corpse problem, then, as a difficulty 
posed for the biological account of personal identity from both sides of the debate is a 
seemingly formidable foe which the animalist must grapple with if he is to be successful. 
 Fortunately, there are replies to be made on behalf of the biological view. In order 
to solve the corpse problem the animalist must deny that there is in fact any one thing that 
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persists through the death of the organism. One line of reply is to argue that there is never 
any corpse to account for. After biological death there may be smaller particles arranged 
“corporeally”, or to follow van Inwagen‟s suggested paraphrase, there may be particles 
arranged “body-wise”, but these particles are never such that they compose any larger 
object such as a corpse or a dead body. This “corpse eliminativism”180, most famously 
defended by Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks181, avoids the question of what to 
say about the dead body by denying that there even is such a thing to be answered for. 
Van Inwagen‟s espousal of “corpse eliminativism” stems from his preoccupation with 
what he calls “the Special Composition Question”:  
  Suppose one had certain (nonoverlapping) objects, the xs, at one‟s   
  disposal; what would one have to do- what could one do- to get the xs to  
  compose something? For example: Suppose that one has a lot of wooden  
  blocks that one may do with as one wills; what must one do to get the  
  blocks to add up to something?182 
 In searching for an answer to this question, van Inwagen considers and rejects 
such principles as “contact,” “fastening,” “cohesion,” and “fusion.”183 The only reply that 
he feels is at all adequate is the formulation of the “life principle” mentioned above.184 
Because smaller particles (in van Inwagen‟s case they would have to be philosophical 
atoms or simples) cannot compose a larger object unless they are caught up in the 
homeodynamic event of a life, it follows that there are no material objects other than 
organisms and philosophical atoms. So van Inwagen concludes, in response to the corpse 
problem, that when the organism‟s life processes cease, the organism itself goes out of 
existence, and due to the lack of any other feasible principle of composition, its former 
parts henceforth fail to compose any object at all. The appeal of this solution to Carter‟s 
(and Shoemaker‟s) challenge is that without a corpse, the corpse problem cannot even get 
off (or out from under!) the ground. 
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 Presumably, few animalists are willing to completely discharge all inanimate 
objects from their respective ontologies. If “corpse eliminativism” were the only response 
to the dead body problem then Carter and others could underline the counterintuitive 
nature of animalism‟s only reply, probably with some success. Olson and Hershenov 
recognize this worry and have offered some non-eliminativist strategies to mitigate the 
concern.185 Consider the fact that the persistence condition of an organism is the 
continuation of its life processes. Through one of these processes, metabolic shuffling, an 
organism can in principle survive complete part replacement as long as the transaction is 
gradual, something that perhaps no other type of object can survive. The life, then, that 
holds the animal together and preserves its identity, is something particular to organisms. 
Corpses, on the other hand, if we are willing to grant that such things exist, do not share 
this compositional feature. Depending on the rules of one‟s ontology, it is uncertain 
whether an inanimate object such as a corpse can survive complete part replacement. In 
fact, the underlying problem according to Olson and Hershenov is that it is unclear what 
precisely it would take to preserve or destroy the numerical identity of a corpse.186 For 
instance, does the corpse cease to exist when more than half of its parts are replaced or 
destroyed? Or is it something to do with functional integrity?187 Whatever the persistence 
conditions of a corpse turn out to be, without the compositional feature of a life to work 
with, they are bound to be radically different than those determining the boundaries of an 
organism.188 Given that no entity can have two sets of radically different persistence 
conditions, the above should be enough to demonstrate that the organism and the corpse 
are not identical. They are not even of the same kind.  
 So does the corpse, then, “pop” into existence when the organism‟s life fades? By 
denying the identification of the corpse and organism, in order for Olson and Hershenov 
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to avoid the problem of coincidental entities, they will have to grant that at death a 
substantial change occurs in which one object ceases to exist and a new one emerges. 
Shoemaker, Carter and others have found this suggestion absurd.189 In response, Olson 
states that 
  The changes that go on in an animal when it dies are really quite dramatic. 
  All of that frenetic, highly organized, and extremely complex biochemical  
  activity that was going on throughout the organism comes to a rather  
  sudden end, and the chemical machinery begins immediately to decay. If it 
  looks like there isn‟t that much difference between a living animal and a  
  fresh corpse, that is because the most striking changes take place at the  
  microscopic level and below.190  
In this case, it is argued, appearances are deceiving. Despite the apparent persistence of a 
single material body through death, an investigation of the real underlying occurrences 
reveals a unique and radical transformation.  
 As I will argue in Chapter Three, while Olson and Hershenov are approaching a 
successful response to the corpse problem, the animalist‟s provisional notion of 
“substantial change” can be supplemented and more ably defended if it takes on the 
resources of a hylomorphic account. It can do so as well without resorting to any sort of 
corpse eliminativism. In concluding this section I will therefore suggest that the challenge 
of dead bodies has not defeated the biological criterion; it has only demanded further 
clarification of the view. 
2.2.2 The Challenge from Proper Parts 
 One of the key premises of Eric Olson‟s argument for animalism is that I am the 
thing that thinks my thoughts. Additionally, I am the thinker “in the strictest possible 
sense,”191 meaning I am not just related (even necessarily) to the object that thinks my 
thoughts, but rather, if there is anything that literally thinks my thoughts, it is I. This 
insight is one Olson borrows from the line of Cartesian thought which passes through the 
work of Roderick Chisholm. Chisholm says 
  There is no reason whatever for supposing that I hope for rain only in  
  virtue of the fact that some other thing hopes for rain – some stand-in that, 
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  strictly and philosophically, is not identical with me but happens to be  
  doing duty for me at this particular moment…If there are thus two things  
  that now hope for rain, the one doing it on its own and the other such that  
  its hoping is done for it by the thing that now happens to constitute it, then 
  I am the former thing and not the latter thing.192 
Assuming that I am, strictly speaking, the thinker of my thoughts, Olson asks, what entity 
in the world corresponds to that category? His argument for the biological account is 
based on the intuitive reply that certainly the animal in my chair is thinking my thoughts. 
To attribute my thoughts to anything else would be to introduce an over-populated 
ontology and the myriad problems of cohabitation. In the absence of any better candidate, 
therefore, I, the thinker of my thoughts, am an animal. 
 In response to this formulation of Olson‟s argument, both Ingmar Persson and Jeff 
McMahan have independently rejected the claim that the animal strictly thinks one‟s 
thoughts.193 Consider the fact (gathered from an even basic understanding of human 
biology) that the brain is the material locus of one‟s psychology. Without a functioning 
brain, the organism could not be said to be capable of thought. Furthermore, Persson 
points out, the brain seems “minimally sufficient” for the realization of relevant 
psychological features.194 As the seeming plausibility of cerebrum transplants 
demonstrates, the persistence of the entire organism may not be necessary for the 
continuation of one‟s thoughts.195  Persson suggests, based on these facts, that a better 
candidate for the thinker of my thoughts would be my brain, a proper part of my brain, or 
certain proper parts of my brain inasmuch as they are functional.196 McMahan likewise 
identifies the person with “regions of the brain in certain functional states”.197  
 Even though they hold that the brain is the thinker of one‟s thoughts in the 
strictest sense, McMahan and Persson do not deny that the animal is an appropriate 
candidate. Both agree that there are two things that can be said to think, the animal and 
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the proper part most relevant for psychology. But they also suggest that the well-known 
problems of collocation can be avoided by stipulating that the animal only thinks 
derivatively in virtue of having a part (the brain) which thinks non-derivatively.198 
McMahan‟s illustration of the derivative/non-derivative relation is an example of a car 
with a noisy horn. It is true that both the car and the horn are noisy, but there are not two 
noises whenever we think we hear just one. Rather, the car is derivatively noisy in virtue 
of having a noisy horn.199 McMahan and Persson contend that if we formulate the 
relationship between the organism and its psychologically relevant proper part using the 
innocuous derivative/non-derivative distinction, then Olson‟s too many thinkers argument 
loses its force.200 And if the strictest thinker of my thoughts turns out to be something 
smaller than the whole organism, then, contrary to the biological account of personal 
identity, I am not identical to any animal. 
 The challenge from proper parts presents two slightly different problems for 
animalism. The first is what Olson refers to as “The Thinking-Brain Problem.”201 If the 
brain thinks our thoughts, and it seems like the best candidate for strictly thinking them, 
why are we not identical to our brains? This problem is explicitly gathered from the 
remarks of Persson and McMahan above. The second problem, implicit in the challenge 
above (and made explicit by Zimmerman and Olson below), is the more general problem 
of rival candidates. The suggestion here is that any candidate for the thinker of your 
thoughts that is not the animal seems to bring in too many thinkers. In addressing these 
challenges below, I will present both actual and possible responses on behalf of the 
animalist. This will ultimately lead to my summary evaluation of the biological approach 
at the conclusion of the chapter. 
2.2.2.1 Thinking brains 
 David Hershenov replies to the proper parts solution to the problem of too many 
thinkers advocated by McMahan and Persson by stating that it “amounts to just moving 
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around the metaphysical bulge in the carpet.”202 By this he means that they have not 
eliminated all of the rival candidates and still face the standard problems of cohabitation. 
Hershenov‟s challenge arises due to the ambiguity of the proper parts account. Am I a 
“functional brain” or am I a brain simpliciter? If I am simply my physical brain, then I 
could survive a complete loss of functionality resulting from the biological death of the 
organism or otherwise. This seems like an undesired conclusion. As Olson points out, it 
would mean that the brain of Albert Einstein sealed in a jar after his organism‟s death and 
stored in a lab would literally be Einstein himself.203 Perhaps as a result of such 
considerations, McMahan stipulates that you and I are only identical to functioning and 
psychologically relevant proper parts of our brains.204 Persson also denies that one can 
persist through a cessation of relevant cognitive processes.205 But by admitting that we are 
not strictly identical to physical brains, Persson and McMahan have, unbeknownst to 
them, reintroduced the problem of too many thinkers.206  
 The functional brain, that which we are identical to according to the revised 
proper parts account, ceases to exist at biological death (or perhaps earlier). The physical 
brain (or at least certain parts of the brain), on the other hand, can presumably survive 
biological death. This difference in persistence conditions leads to the conclusion that 
they are numerically distinct entities. And if prior to biological death the physical brain 
(or at least one relevant part of the brain) is situated in the same place as the functional 
brain, we have a return to cognitive co-location.207  
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 Hershenov argues that the derivative/non-derivative distinction used by McMahan 
and Persson to alleviate their admittance of too many thinkers, while appropriate in many 
circumstances, is still susceptible to the false ascription problem.208 Consider the thought, 
„I am essentially a person‟.209 A person is indeed essentially a person according to the 
McMahan-Persson view, but an organism can survive the loss of personhood. So if both 
the organism and the person think „I am a person‟ concurrently, the person‟s statement is 
true while the same thought considered by the organism is false. The falsity of the 
organism‟s thought indicates that it refers to itself when it considers the essentiality of its 
personhood. And if the person does the same (which it must if its statement is true), then 
the content of the thought allegedly shared by both thinkers is nonequivalent. What 
Hershenov demonstrates is that in this case there would have to be two distinct thoughts, 
due to their distinct referents, rather than one thought understood derivatively.    
 In addition to hinting at a too many thinkers problem for McMahan and Persson 
similar to that argued for by Hershenov,210 Eric Olson also expresses his own particular 
concerns for a proper parts account. The appeal of the brain criterion is that it seems to 
present a strong (perhaps the strongest) candidate for the strictest thinker of one‟s 
thoughts. The underlying assumption is that I must be identical to that thing and only that 
thing that directly thinks my thoughts. Olson calls this stance “thinking-subject 
minimalism.”211 But what parts, asks Olson, are directly involved in my thoughts? The 
entire brain is certainly not directly involved in thought. Blood vessels and the contained 
blood cells are within the spatial confines of the brain, but they serve only to regulate the 
higher functions, rather than participating themselves.212 I must then be identical to some 
smaller part or parts of my brain. But even nerve cells have components geared towards 
the circulation and maintenance of the cell rather than cognition.213 It would follow that I 
am only a set of certain coordinating parts of certain nerve cells directly relevant for the 
introduction of psychological features. But how does one draw the line between parts of 
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the nerve cell that are directly involved in thought and those that are only indirectly 
involved? Olson contends that any answer to this question is bound to be arbitrary and 
unprincipled.214 Using thinking-subject minimalism to determine our boundaries leads to 
the conclusion that we have no idea how big we are or which parts we have.215 “The 
organism,” however, “has a nonarbitrary boundary, and it would appear to be the largest 
thing whose behavior we can explain in terms of its thinking.”216 Olson concludes, then, 
that the animal is a more principled candidate for my thought. 
 Olson‟s larger concern about proper parts theory is that it puts us too far away 
from the world. Even if we could determine the boundaries of the entity directly involved 
in thinking, consider the repercussions of only being that subject of thought. Any parts of 
my brain not directly involved in my thinking are not a part of me. The parts not directly 
responsible for philosophical reflection, but are more directly responsible for sight (call 
the set of these parts the “vision module”217) or those more directly responsible for 
hearing (call this set the “hearing module”) cannot be properly said to be parts of me. 
When the vision module sees and the hearing module hears, I do neither of these things. I 
may be intimately related to those modules such that I may receive the content of my 
reflection from their collected data, but I would always be one additional step removed 
from the external world. As Olson points out, following Chisholm,218 the proper parts 
theorist‟s denial of the fact that any one thing can perceive and reflect on that same 
perception makes even the most basic kind of self-knowledge impossible.219 
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 As I argued in Chapter 1, in addition to the worries expressed by Hershenov and 
Olson, a brain criterion also faces the problem of duplication. Recall that one of the 
driving justifications of PCT accounts is the possibility that I could be relocated with my 
transplanted cerebrum.220 Proper parts theorists such as McMahan and Persson, to 
maintain consistency, can and should consider the physical relocation of one‟s 
psychology person-preserving. Furthermore, if, as Olson‟s analysis indicates, I must be 
identical to a part much smaller than my entire brain, it is not necessary to transplant the 
entire cerebrum. The psychologically relevant parts of a single hemisphere may be 
sufficient. But by severing the corpus callosum and performing a double transplant of 
psychologically relevant proper parts of my brain, my identity can be fissioned out of 
existence, even if each procedure is meticulously executed in a fashion qualitatively 
identical to that used in a single hemisphere transplant. The proper parts theorist could 
reply that there may be only one psychologically relevant part of the brain per human 
organism, and it cannot be severed without destroying it. But if the studies featured in the 
personal identity literature are deemed reliable,221 this seems not to be the case. It is likely 
true that either hemisphere is sufficient for the maintenance of psychological features. 
Duplication, then, is a recurring problem for the proper parts view. 
 Both Olson and Hershenov have ably demonstrated the difficulties in precisely 
formulating a proper parts account. Their responses to the McMahan-Persson theory of 
personal identity are sufficient to signal its inadequacy. But even if we are forced to 
abandon the principle of thinking-subject minimalism, there are general concerns that 
Olson and Hershenov have not appropriately addressed. Dismissing a specific 
formulation of the proper parts account does little to answer the issue of rival candidates. 
It seems like a legitimate question to ask why my head cannot think or why my body is 
not the thinker of my thoughts or if there are appropriate candidates for thought such as 
the upper half of my body or the left hemisphere of my brain, why I am not one of those 
things. It is this general problem of rival candidates to which I will now turn. 
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2.2.2.2 Rival candidates and the state of animalism 
 In considering Olson‟s argument for animalism, Dean Zimmerman observes that 
in premise two, which states that “the human animal sitting in your chair is thinking,” the 
term „human animal‟ can be replaced by just about any other candidate for thought and be 
used as an argument for identifying ourselves with that thing.222 For example, we could 
just as easily make a similar argument for our being identical to a „Mere Body,‟ a 
„Psychological Person,‟ or a „Mere Hunk of Matter.‟223 Acknowledging the problem, 
Olson adds „my head‟ and „my brain‟ to the list of potential candidates.224 But if (almost) 
any number of terms can be substituted for „human animal,‟ why give animals the 
preferential treatment? Or as Zimmerman puts it, “What sort of support can one adduce 
for this premise? Why do I think there is an animal here? Or, better, why does Olson 
think this, with respect to himself, when he is alone in a room?”225 
 Olson admits that, in response to the problem of rival candidates, there are only 
three ways to defend premise two.226 First, the animalist could present an argument for 
why smaller parts or rival candidates cannot think in the strictest sense, or at least why 
the animal is the best candidate for that position. An example of this strategy is his 
dismissal of proper parts accounts as arbitrary or unprincipled. Second, one could offer an 
epistemic solution. Granting that proper parts or rival candidates are just as valid an 
option for the thinker of one‟s thoughts as animals, it might still be possible to know that 
I am in fact the animal rather than any of those other things. Third, the biological account 
of personal identity can be defended by denying that any such rivals exist. There just are 
not any other candidates.  
 Olson is not entirely pleased with any of these options,227 but the one he finds 
most promising is the third. Borrowing from van Inwagen‟s work on the special 
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composition question,228 Olson argues that the only feasible principle of composition for 
material objects is the principle of an organism‟s life. We saw earlier that this stance can 
be used as a solution to the corpse problem by denying the very existence of those 
things.229 Here Olson extends the project so as to exclude from his ontology any 
candidates not individuated and identified over time by a life. Therefore, there are no 
“mere bodies,” “psychological persons” or “mere hunks of matter.” This may sound 
plausible enough. But what the “sparse ontologist” must also deny is that we have any of 
the parts we normally think we do, like heads, hands, or hearts.230 If animalists are willing 
to take their ontological solutions to the problem of personal identity this far, then they 
will have their responses to challengers, but if the sparse ontology is the only way to 
defend the biological account against its rivals, it is bound to be an unattractive position. 
Of course, as Olson replies, “any sensible account of what we are faces its own version of 
the rival-candidates problem.”231 He continues, 
  I don‟t have a good solution…Zimmerman is right to say that I am   
  inclined to solve it by denying the existence of the rivals. I‟d like to say  
  that there is no hunk of matter standing here, and no being with   
  psychological persistence conditions, and –this is the bit I like least of all –
  no head. There is only animal, and a lot of particles. I am inclined to  
  accept a sparse ontology of material objects. Why? Well, because the  
  alternatives look even worse. This is not a nice thing to have to say, but I  
  can‟t see any good way of avoiding it. If you don‟t like it, tell me how you 
  would solve the rival-candidates problem.232 
 In response to Olson‟s challenge, my chapter three will be dedicated to presenting 
a hylomorphic account of personal identity, which, when accompanied by the larger 
metaphysical system of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, does have its own solutions to the 
most common problems for animalism. It also will not require an ontology as sparse as 
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the one offered by Olson and van Inwagen. In this regard, it will be demonstrated how a 
hylomorphic animalism can capture the metaphysical consistency of the biological 
account without its pitfalls. In the second half of chapter three, I will offer a defense of a 
recent alternative interpretation of hylomorphism which gives considerable weight to 
both the thinking animal argument of the biological account and the cerebrum transplant 
literature considered by PCT. I will conclude with a summary analysis and evaluation of 
the three main views considered in this thesis and offer arguments as to why I think 
hylomorphism is the most successful. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
HYLOMORPHISM 
3.1 A General Account 
Similar to the way in which psychological continuity theory develops from a 
general conception of persons, and animalism relies on an implicit understanding of the 
persistence conditions of biological organisms, a hylomorphic account of personal 
identity is a specific application of a more far-reaching ontological framework. 
Hylomorphism in general is the view that every material object is composed of two 
distinct metaphysical parts
233
: matter and form.
234,235
 Inasmuch as we too are material 
objects, hylomorphism as a theory of personal ontology entails that every human 
individual has these two components: each one of us is a composite of matter and a 
certain type of form, the form being that which is primarily explanatory of our persistence 
over time.  
In this third and final chapter, I will present a case for a hylomorphic account of 
personal identity by demonstrating how it can respond to problems faced by the two main 
views featured in the previous chapters. I will also consider two recent formulations of 
hylomorphism, that, though incompatible with one another, offer intriguing, if not 
compelling, suggestions for where in the contemporary debate a hylomorphic view 
should fall. But before assessing hylomorphism as a theory of personal identity in 
particular, I will first attempt to construct the account from its foundation. 
3.1.1 The Metaphysics of Hylomorphism 
 In order to make sense of a hylomorphic view of personal identity it is first 
necessary to become acquainted with the relevant terminology and metaphysical 
commitments of a general hylomorphic ontology. To what do the terms „matter‟ and 
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„form‟ refer? And what can they tell us about our persistence conditions? In this section I 
will offer a brief survey of these issues. Here, as throughout this chapter, my most 
frequent resources are the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Thomistic philosophers in 
the analytic tradition, though when appropriate I will make note of the relevant passages 
in the Aristototelian corpus that Thomism inherits.
236
 
 One of the signature marks of the Aristotelian-Thomist ontology is the particular 
account of matter that it espouses. In contrast to a view such as atomism, which posits as 
the most fundamental aspects of the physical world actually-existent, self-contained, 
indivisible particles or atoms,
237
 hylomorphism suggests that matter in its most basic 
sense does not contain any actuality at all.
238
 This is to say that matter by itself lacks all 
qualities, with the important exception that it can be made into something that has 
qualities. So-called “prime matter” is in this regard nothing but a substratum of pure 
potentiality from which the objects in the universe are fashioned.
239
 An illustrative 
example of the difference between an atomistic view of matter and hylomorphism is a 
pile of bricks and a hunk of clay.
240
 Though both can be used to make just about 
anything, the individual bricks are already actual entities on their own prior to any 
construction, whereas the hunk of clay is relatively unactualized prior to its being 
moulded. A hunk of clay is not a perfect example of prime matter, due to the fact that it 
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has actual properties such as color and some sort of shape, but when contrasted with the 
set of individual bricks, it brings us closer to an idea of unactualized potentiality.  
 The degree to which a hylomorphist must take seriously the reality of a 
substratum of pure potentiality is a matter of some debate,
241
 but it is at least necessary to 
posit its existence conceptually in order for hylomorphism to get started. So in 
considering material objects, and in particular, human beings within the hylomorphic 
framework, it is important to keep in mind that the matter in the matter/form composite 
refers to a notion of unactualized potentiality, or prime matter.  
 When conceived of as nothing but passive potentiality, it is immediately apparent 
that matter is not alone sufficient for the construction of even everyday objects; given that 
material objects are indeed actual there must be something that actualizes them. A form, 
then, is the actualizing principle of every material object that draws from prime matter its 
inherent potencies in order to, with matter, compose the object itself.
242
 This definition, of 
course, requires some fleshing out. The term „principle‟ in scholastic jargon is rather 
ambiguous. Aquinas at one point suggests that “the terms „principle‟ and „cause‟ can be 
used interchangeably”243 and that “generally speaking everything from which some 
change begins can be called a principle”.244 At other times I think what Aquinas means 
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by principle is anything through which or with which a certain potency is able to be 
realized, most noticeably when he says that the eye is a principle of vision.
245
 Basically, 
then, a principle is the cause of any actuality. But importantly, this need not commit the 
hylomorphist to any kind of temporal succession of matter, form and then their 
composite. As Oderberg explains, matter is “constitutively prior and logically prior,” but 
there is no relevant sense in which the material component of an individual exists before 
it is informed.
246
  
Additionally, there are two senses of potency that require actualization, which in 
turn correspond to the two types of forms in the hylomorphic ontology. Prime matter can 
be said to be in potentiality inasmuch as it can be made into a certain sort or kind of 
object. The form that is principally responsible for making prime matter into an actual 
substantial object is called an object‟s substantial form. That same object can also be said 
to be in potentiality inasmuch as it can gain or lose certain properties or modifications. 
Any form that actualizes certain properties or accidents is called an accidental form. The 
example used by Aquinas to illustrate these points is a man who is made a human being 
(the kind of thing he is) by his substantial form and is made white (a non-essential 
property of the man) by an accidental form.
247
 When hylomorphism states that every 
material object, and specifically for the purposes of this thesis, a human individual, is 
composed of form and matter, the relevant form being considered here is the entity‟s 
substantial form - that which makes it what it is.  
This puts us in a better position to begin to understand what the hylomorphic 
account of material objects entails. Every material object is composed of both a selection 
of passively potential prime matter and an actualizing substantial form which makes it the 
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kind of thing it is. This, however, is only one step towards outlining a hylomorphic 
account of personal ontology. Notably, not all substantial forms are created equal, and as 
human beings we have a very particular type. In what follows I will attempt to elaborate 
on this notion so as to draw from the discussion the features of our substantial form that 
will become important for determining our own persistence conditions later on. 
Thus far we have defined a substantial form as that which realizes or actualizes 
matter so as to make the thing in question the type of thing it is. But what does this 
“actualizer”248 really refer to? The answer to this question depends, I propose, on the 
object we are considering. That is why the basic definition of form is so vague. It is an 
attempt to capture in a single category a multitude of referents. With that said, however, 
there are certain characterizations of substantial form in the literature that will prove 
informative. In the case of non-human material objects, for example, Eleonore Stump 
argues that we should understand substantial form as “the configurational state of a 
material object that makes the object a member of the kind of species to which it belongs 
and gives it the causal powers characteristic of things of that kind.”249 This definition 
provides us with a helpful illustration of the complementary nature of form and matter. 
The form of a material object is not identical to the matter itself but to the way the matter 
is arranged. This idea seems to be what Aquinas is getting at when he says that the 
substantial form of a human being “is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which 
is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.”250 While the 
substantial form of a human being is importantly different from other material forms (as 
will be further explained below), and it is clear that he is speaking analogously, the 
example of heat nevertheless neatly corresponds to Stump‟s notion of a “configurational 
state”. Heat is not something identified by pointing to a certain selection of matter but by 
making note of the behaviour or organizational functionality of the object‟s material 
constituents. 
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It is tempting to infer from the above that a material object‟s form corresponds 
simply to its shape. While this is not entirely inaccurate,
251
 the case of living things 
demonstrates the inadequacy of such a simplification. As Stump notes (speaking for 
Aquinas), a form denotes a dynamic consistency rather than a static one.
252
 For example, 
an oak tree begins its existence as a small sapling with a few branches, and after many 
years of change and growth, the same oak takes on a radically different shape. 
Furthermore, as Pasnau and Shields indicate, a statue of a human being is not itself a 
human being, despite being shaped like one.
253
 Sameness of shape, then, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the identification of a living material object.
254
 What is 
necessary and sufficient for the continuity of material objects, and most evidently living 
material objects, is the sameness of functional configuration, meaning the object 
continues to be arranged in such a way as to have the capacity to exhibit the types of 
functions naturally attributed to its kind.
255
 This sense of functional configuration is, as I 
see it, the proper definition of substantial form as it is constitutive of non-human material 
objects. 
Aquinas, following Aristotle, holds that living things require a distinct type of 
form in order to actualize the functions that make them alive. A living thing grows and 
decays, takes in nutrients and expels waste, reproduces, and displays both directionality 
and limitation “from within.”256  In the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, this “first principle 
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of life of those things which live” is called the soul.257 All living things, then, have as 
their substantial form a particular, individuated
258
 soul. But there are also varieties of 
souls, differentiated by their characteristic functions. An oak tree, for example, has only 
basic capacities such as nutrition and reproduction and thus it is informed by a nutritive 
soul. A non-human animal such as a dog or a cat has the capacity for nutrition and 
reproduction, but it also has the capacity for sensation. All of these are incorporated into 
its sensitive soul. Lastly, a human being has the capacity to engage in (among other 
things) nutrition, sensation and cognition. Our own substantial form is therefore an 
intellective or rational soul.
259
 
Though they are placed in the same category as the souls of human beings, the 
substantial forms of plants and animals are still “material forms,” meaning they are 
dependent upon their material instantiation for their continued existence.
260
 As Stump 
notes, “a plant has a soul in virtue of the fact that it has a configuration of matter which 
allows for nutrition, growth, reproduction, and other sorts of activities common to living 
things...[but] even a material form that is a soul goes out of existence when the material 
composite it configures goes out of existence.”261 Human beings, on the other hand, have 
the distinctive capacities for cognition and self-reflection. According to Aquinas, the 
process of cognition or intellection is an immaterial act (“an operation per se apart from 
the body”),262 and because “only that which subsists can have an operation per se...[w]e 
                                                          
257
 Aquinas, ST, I, q.75, a.1, corp. Compare to Aristotle‟s definition of the soul as “the first actuality of a 
natural body which potentially has life” (De Anima, II, 1). It is worth pointing out that the English word 
„soul‟ corresponds in this context to the Latin word „anima‟, which is where we get our terms „animate‟ and 
„inanimate‟. As opposed to the modern connotation, soul here just means that which makes something 
living rather than non-living. 
258
 The way in which the substantial form is individuated will be explored in section 3.2.1 below. 
259
 See, among other places, Aquinas, ST, I, q.76, a.3, corp. 
260
 Stump, Aquinas, 201. 
261
 Ibid., with reference to Aquinas, ST, I, q.75, a.3, corp. 
262
 Aquinas, ST, q.75, a.2, corp. I will have to gloss over this point for the time being. A thorough 
hylomorphic account of personal ontology does require an underlying defense of the immateriality of the 
intellect, but these issues in the philosophy of mind are beyond the scope of this paper. For relevant 
discussions of Aquinas‟ arguments see David Oderberg, “Concepts, Dualism, and the Human Intellect”; 
John Haldane, “The Metaphysics of Intellect(ion)” (cited above); James Ross, “Immaterial Aspects of 
Thought,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Mar. 1992): 136-150. The focus of this chapter is not 
to justify Aquinas‟ account by validating the premises, but rather to demonstrate its resourcefulness once 
the premises are accepted.  
 78 
must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is 
something incorporeal and subsistent.”263  
Being immaterial, the substantial form of a human individual is unlike the 
substantial forms of both inanimate objects and non-human organisms in that it is not 
itself a configurational state. The rational soul, however, remains principally responsible 
for the actuality, specificity, and unity of the human body, and as such, Aquinas 
maintains, it can properly be called a substantial form.
264
 Following Stump, we can say 
that the rational soul of a human being is not a configurational state, but a “configured 
configurer,” something seemingly able to exist on its own, while at the same time serving 
as a principle of organization for a selection of unactualized prime matter.
265
 
Explaining that the substantial form of a human being is a “configured 
configurer,” however, tells us little about what it actually is. We can gather from the 
above that it must be an immaterial something, but it does not seem like we can say much 
more than that. Aquinas appears to recognize the problem in stating, “though it [the 
rational soul] has the existence in itself which belongs to a „particular thing‟ [Hoc 
aliquid], it is not a complete nature by itself; it is rather a part of a specific nature.”266 
“Hence,” he concludes, “it is not in all respects a „particular thing.‟”267 He later goes on 
to say that the rational soul can be considered a particular thing in some respect due to its 
ability to subsist,
268
 but he does not offer much more clarification than that.  
The issue of precisely categorizing the rational soul may be a stumbling block for 
a robust hylomorphic account,
269
 but importantly there are certain things that can be said 
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about a human being‟s substantial form that will facilitate its appropriation into an 
account of personal ontology. For instance, a rational soul, while serving as a substantial 
form, can be said to have a spatial location
270
 and a determination in time.
271
 Stump 
emphasizes this fact in saying that “while the body is alive and the soul configures it, the 
soul is located where the body is.”272 Stump also notes that the rational soul is simple “in 
the sense that it is not the sort of thing that has a certain quantity.”273 For the purposes of 
our investigation, then, let us say that the rational soul is an immaterial something, which 
nevertheless has the qualities of spatial location, temporal determination and simplicity, 
and it serves as the actualizing and organizing principle of a selection of passively 
potential prime matter in order to compose, with its material complement, a single 
individual human being. Thus, we can, with greater clarification, return to the assertion 
above that each of us is numerically identical to a composite of matter and form. 
With this determination in mind, the rest of chapter three will be dedicated to my 
own assessment of hylomorphism as an account of personal ontology. I will first compare 
hylomorphism to substance dualism, suggesting that, while it is a form of dualism, the 
Thomistic position can avoid most of the latter view‟s pitfalls when understood correctly. 
Next, I will introduce an animalist interpretation of hylomorphism and show how the 
larger hylomorphic ontology can provide the resources needed to respond to problems for 
a biological account. In sections 3.3 – 3.3.2 I will investigate a recent alternative 
interpretation of hylomorphism that claims that we are only contingently animals. 
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probably list the qualities that electrons have or certain effects that they have on other things. It is 
essentially this sort of response that I provide in the sentences that follow. 
270
 “Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have 
seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of 
essence” (Aquinas, ST, I, q.76, a.8, corp., emphasis added) 
271
 Both Eleonore Stump (Aquinas, 173) and Jason Eberl (“Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings,” The 
Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 58 (Dec. 2004): 343) suggest that a rational soul cannot pre-exist its material 
complement, though it may continue to exist when that complement loses its functional configuration. See 
also Kevin White, “Aquinas on the Immediacy of the Union of Soul and Body,” in Paul Lockey, Studies in 
Thomistic Theology (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1995): 209-280.  
272
 Stump, Aquinas, 202. 
273
 Ibid., 201. This seems to follow from Aquinas assertion that the soul is “wholly present” in each of a 
human being‟s parts (ST, I, q.76, a.8, corp.). There is not more of the soul in the heart or in the brain, 
though there may be certain powers that are manifested in those places rather than in others. See also 
Stump, Aquinas, 200-201. I will say more about this notion of simplicity in section 3.2.1 below. 
 80 
3.1.2 Hylomorphism versus Substance Dualism 
 Substance dualism in the Cartesian tradition is based on two key claims. The first 
is that the body and the mind (or body and soul) are distinct substances in their own right 
and can independently engage in activities natural to their kind. Descartes argues that “we 
clearly perceive the mind, that is, a thinking substance, apart from the body, that is, an 
extended substance.”274 And furthermore, he says 
[t]he inference to be drawn from these results [the results of his 
meditations] is that all the things that we clearly and distinctly conceive of 
as different substances (as we do in the case of mind and body) are in fact 
substances which are really distinct from the other.
275
 
The second claim made by Descartes is that, as an answer to the question of personal 
ontology, he (and presumably each one of us) is identical to a mind or soul, otherwise 
known as a thinking substance: 
I saw...that from the mere fact of doubting the truth of other things, it 
followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed...From this I knew I 
was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely to think, and 
which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in 
order to exist. Accordingly this „I‟ – that is, the soul by which I am what I 
am – is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than 
the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not 
exist.
276
 
 Although Aquinas holds that the rational soul is something subsistent,
277
 and that 
it can exist on its own after the corruption of the body,
278
 he would nevertheless disagree 
with Descartes on the two points above. In response to the suggestion that we are, strictly 
speaking, only souls, Aquinas insists, on the contrary, that “a human being is a third thing 
composed from two components, body and soul, both differing from the whole (for a 
human being is neither soul nor body).”279 And in an oft-quoted passage from one of his 
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biblical commentaries, he states quite simply, “My soul is not me.”280 Aquinas was aware 
of views that identified a human individual with only his or her own soul,
281
 and he 
vehemently rejects them. He argues that sensation is an act properly attributable to that 
which we are. But “whatever performs the operations proper to a thing,” Aquinas asserts,  
is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is 
man. But it has been shown above (A. 3)
282
 that sensation is not the 
operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, 
but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something 
composed of soul and body.
283
 
So sensation, according to Aquinas, is a bodily act as well as a psychical one. In order for 
my senses to be properly attributable to me, I cannot be the soul alone, but rather, I must 
be the man, that is, the body/soul composite.
284
  
In response to the suggestion that the body and the mind (or body and soul) are 
distinct, independently acting substances, Aquinas insists, on the contrary, that “body and 
soul are not two actually existing substances; rather, the two of them together constitute 
one actually existing substance.”285 As indicated above, according to a Thomistic 
hylomorphic account, the body (or selection of prime matter) is not actually anything 
until it is organized by a substantial form, and thus it cannot be considered a substance in 
its own right. The soul too cannot be considered a substance because by itself it does not 
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have “the complete nature of its species.”286 I will have more to say concerning Aquinas‟ 
account of substance in section 3.2.2 below, but it should be clear from these remarks that 
hylomorphism rejects not only the second claim of substance dualism, but the first as 
well.
287
 
 In denying the two main tenets of the Cartesian sort, hylomorphic dualism (if it 
can be called that) appears at once to be a strikingly different variety, and as such, it 
avoids many of the problems associated with the substance dualist position.
288
 First, by 
attributing sensation to the human individual herself, hylomorphism is not susceptible to 
the same epistemological difficulties faced by early modern philosophers (or, for that 
matter, brain identity theorists
289
). Instead of detaching the person from the natural world 
and attempting to bridge that gap with intermediaries, hylomorphism places us among the 
objects of our everyday experience and allows us to be directly aware of the things that 
we perceive.
290
 Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, hylomorphism has a much more 
feasible solution to the mind-body interaction problem. If, as the first tenet of substance 
dualism suggests, the body and the soul are two distinct, independently functioning 
substances in their own right, the question inevitably arises as to how these things of such 
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radically distinct natures can interact. Even if such an account could be provided, there is 
still the question as to why my soul interacts with only my body and not others.
291
 
 Aquinas was well aware of this difficulty and he argues that it is not a problem for 
his hylomorphism: 
There has been much uncertainty about the way the soul and body are 
conjoined. Some had supposed a sort of medium connecting the two 
together by a sort of bond. But the difficulty can be set aside now that it 
has been shown that the soul is the form of the body. As he [Aristotle] 
says, there is no more reason to ask whether soul and body together make 
one thing than to ask the same about wax and the impression sealed on 
it.
292
 
The first thing to notice about St. Thomas‟s reply is that it almost presciently 
anticipates Descartes‟ suggestion that the soul is joined to the body by a “sort of bond,” 
that is, the pineal gland – Descartes‟ “medium” of choice.293 The second thing to notice is 
that Aquinas quite clearly thinks such strategies are unnecessary. If the soul is properly 
understood as the substantial form of the body, then its relation to its material counterpart 
is no more mysterious than a seal pressed in wax. Now, of course, this can only be 
understood analogously, due to the fact mentioned above that the rational soul is more 
than just the configurational state of a selection of matter, but as actualizing principle the 
soul is nevertheless an obvious and necessary component of the human being. There 
cannot even be a human body without the formal influence of the rational soul. Its causal 
efficacy is not, however, to be understood as denoting an exertion of force between two 
substances. Rather, the soul is causally relevant for our consideration of the body in 
roughly the same way that the shape of a knife causes it to cut. The strength of 
hylomorphic dualism, then, is that it does not make a special case for human beings in 
needing a complementary part. The concept of a rational soul is just an extension of the 
form/matter duality present throughout the natural world. 
 Hylomorphism as a theory of personal ontology admittedly contains some 
dualistic elements. Each of us has a soul that is purportedly immaterial and subsistent. 
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But what I hope to have demonstrated in this section is that this need not commit us to 
any form of Cartesian dualism. Crucially, hylomorphism does not identify the individual 
with her soul, but instead offers a more holistic approach in which each person is a 
composite of body and soul; ultimately, hylomorphism coincides with the view that you 
and I are living, breathing, human beings. Following this suggestion, in the next section I 
will emphasize and elaborate on hylomorphism‟s affinities with animalism. 
3.2 Hylomorphic Animalism 
 Thomistic hylomorphism works its way into animalism by arguing that we must 
belong to the category of things that have the natural capacity for both sensation and 
cognition. According to a hylomorphic account of personal ontology, we are animals in 
the Aristotelian sense in virtue of having the first capacity
294
 and, more specifically, we 
are rational animals in virtue of the second. Aquinas himself confirms this point in 
stipulating that “„animal‟ is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally.”295 
Hylomorphism, then, can be considered a kind of animalism (as even Olson himself is apt 
to admit
296
), and recent advocates of the position have emphasized its proximity to the 
contemporary biological views espoused by Olson, van Inwagen and others. In this 
section I will explore the similarities and differences between these two brands of 
animalism and ultimately conclude that hylomorphic animalism captures most, if not all, 
of the important insights of its modern equivalent. 
 First, both hylomorphic animalism (hereafter referred to as HA) and Olsonian 
animalism (OA) recognize the infeasibility of basing an account of diachronic identity on 
any specific selection of material parts. As was demonstrated in section 2.1.1 above, one 
of greatest virtues of a biological account is that it recognizes and utilizes the biological 
fact of metabolic shuffling to its advantage. The gradual but inevitable part replacement 
of organisms through consumption and expulsion can be seen as a grave concern for a 
strict bodily account, but OA incorporates this dynamism into its formulation and argues 
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that the greater unity of the organism in spite of the radical change of its parts points to a 
single unifying event - its life.  
HA likewise rejects a static view of material objects and a fortiori of organisms. 
Though he was obviously unaware of what modern biology tells us about metabolic 
shuffling, Aquinas anticipates such findings and builds his account around them. He uses 
as a helpful illustration the example of a fire: 
[W]hen a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to 
be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already 
existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together 
loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will 
be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other 
wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the 
same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added 
passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by 
means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural 
heat.
297
 
As this passage clearly shows, matter in the form/matter composite of hylomorphism 
does not entail a static selection of material constituents. It is true that I must be made of 
some matter but I need not consist of this very matter that now serves to identify me.
298
 
Instead, what signifies my identity over time is the continuity of functional organization 
such that whatever parts I have continue to be arranged in an order suitable for the 
manifestation of my essential capacities. While the rational soul of a human being cannot 
be reduced to the set of life processes that ensure this stability,
299
 the continuity of my life 
is perhaps the best evidence that my identity persists. 
 As a second point of agreement, some advocates of HA have taken Aquinas‟ 
assertion that we are essentially animals to mean precisely what OA claims - that 
psychological continuity (at least overt psychological continuity) is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the continuation of one‟s identity over time. For if it is true that we are 
numerically identical to animals of a certain type, then we should have the persistence 
conditions of animals, namely those of the biological sort.
 300 
But what about the 
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seemingly plausible intuition that I will be transported with my functioning cerebrum in 
the case of its transplant? Patrick Toner argues that a disembodied cerebrum is not the 
kind of thing that can be said to be capable of sensation, and therefore, even under the 
Aristotelian definition of animality it would not qualify as an animal.
301
 Inasmuch as I am 
essentially an animal, the removed cerebrum cannot be me. I cannot accompany it 
through transplantation. But if the cerebrumless animal remains and continues to exhibit 
its biological functions then it can be said to be the kind of thing capable of sensation, 
even if the removal of its cerebrum severely limits its ability to do so. It is, therefore, 
more plausible according to HA to conclude that in the case of a cerebrum transplant I 
would still be identical to the living, breathing human organism rather than the removed 
cerebrum. Lee and George argue that even if the other organism that received my 
cerebrum began to instantiate all or most of my memories, beliefs, desires and intentions 
we should understand these psychological features as being qualitatively similar to my 
own but nevertheless numerically distinct.
302
 
 Furthermore, Lee and George seem to subscribe to the view espoused by Olson 
and van Inwagen according to which the brain stem is the important indicator of 
biological continuity.
303
 This will have important repercussions for distinguishing 
conjoined twins, establishing a whole-brain criterion for the death of the organism, and 
presumably for deciding on the possibility of whole-brain transplants.
304
 Lee and 
George‟s position seems in this regard consonant with other biological accounts. Though 
not all advocates of HA are willing to stress the brain stem itself as a principle of 
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persistence,
305
 in general HA seems to agree with OA against PCT theorists on the issues 
related to cerebrum transplantation. 
 Another area of overlap between the two brands of animalism is that HA is 
compatible with Olson‟s thinking animal argument.306 As Hershenov puts it, “Since 
hylomorphism does not posit the spatial coincidence of a human person and a human 
animal, but identifies the thinking person with the living animal, there is no problem of 
too many thinkers.”307 Olson, however, raises the objection that hylomorphism inherits its 
own version of too many thinkers by including as a necessary component of every human 
individual a particular rational soul.
308
 The problem emerges due to Thomistic 
hylomorphism‟s insistence that the disembodied soul can by itself think and reflect on its 
previous embodiment after its departure from the body.
309
 Olson asks, 
[I]f your soul can think when it is disembodied, why can it not think when 
it is embodied? If it does think when it is embodied, yet it isn‟t you, then 
you are not the being that now thinks your thoughts, but are merely 
something that has that thinker as a part. Thomists would then face the 
same thinking-soul problem as compound dualists face.
310
 
 Toner‟s response to this problem is to say that the soul will have a radically 
different mode of existence when disembodied, and any ability it may have then is not 
necessarily present during its embodiment.
311
 I think this is precisely what the HA 
theorist will have to say if he or she wishes to grant that the disembodied soul thinks, and 
as a response, it is not obviously ad hoc. Importantly, what the hylomorphic animalist 
must maintain is that while embodied the soul is not the thinker of one‟s thoughts.  
 As Toner asserts, there is ample evidence in the Thomistic literature that this is 
what Aquinas himself believed. For Aquinas says, “we may therefore say that the soul 
understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through 
                                                          
305
 Patrick Toner, for instance, is less convinced that a whole-brain transplant would preserve the identity of 
an animal in the Aristotelian sense (Toner, “Hylomorphic Animalism”). 
306
 Ibid. 
307
 David Hershenov, “Soulless Organisms? Hylomorphism vs. Animalism,” (Forthcoming). 
308
 Olson, What Are We?, 175-176. 
309
 Aquinas, ST, I, q.89, a.1, corp. 
310
 Olson, What Are We?, 175-176. 
311
 Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism.” Toner cites, in defense of this claim, Aquinas‟ remarks concerning 
the disembodied soul‟s mode of existence in ST, I, q.89, a.1. 
 88 
the soul.”312 What Aquinas seems to be getting at here is the way in which some of our 
parts are used for certain activities without the parts themselves being the subject of the 
act. For instance, I can shoot a basketball with my hands but we would not attribute the 
act of shooting a basketball solely to my hands. Rather, the action is something that 
requires the coordination of many of my parts and its complete explanation will 
necessarily include reference to me as the larger organism. Therefore, the thinking animal 
problem is not violated by positing a rational soul as a complement to the material nature 
of a human being. Rather, the assertion that activities such as thought must be attributable 
to the human organism in its entirety (by virtue of specific powers) is yet one more way 
in which HA and OA agree. 
     By including a comparative analysis of HA‟s and OA‟s treatment of metabolic 
shuffling, cerebrum transplantation and the thinking animal argument, I hope to have 
demonstrated the significant affinity between the two views. In the following sections I 
will argue further that hylomorphic animalism not only captures the insights of the 
animalist position, but it also has the resources to properly respond to its challenges. 
3.2.1 Persistence and Individuation 
The problem of intransitivity is an issue that confronts all accounts of personal 
identity. In Chapter 1 I argued that it is, pace Parfit and Lewis, a serious objection to any 
view that relies on the continuity of memories.
313
 This was due to the fact that 
psychological continuity must necessarily introduce degrees of identity and this very 
admittance will undermine any attempt by the PCT theorist to construct an account of 
numerical identity over time. In Chapter 2, I argued that biological accounts of personal 
identity offer an interesting reply to this objection.
314
 Animalists posit as the principle of 
persistence the continuity of the event of an organism‟s life. I suggested that as long as 
the animalist insists on the numerical identity of an organism‟s life at any stage of its 
career it can avoid intransitivity. But in order to do so, he or she must provide an account 
of the simplicity of the life relation. In other words, there cannot be more or less of the 
relation between the stages of an organism‟s career as it persists through time.  
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The requirement that every human individual must have a simple, numerically 
persistent component lends itself most readily to an account of personal identity that 
includes a notion of the immaterial. It may very well be that Thomas Reid himself was 
aiming for this kind of conclusion when he first introduced the problem. Roderick 
Chisholm, who himself was following Joseph Butler, uses a similar argument to point to 
the fact that we must be identical to a simple immaterial part in order to preserve our 
“strict and philosophical” identity over time.315 Where hylomorphism differs from 
Chisholm‟s view and other substance dualisms is in its assertion that we are not identical 
to a simple immaterial being, but rather, each of us has a simple immaterial part – namely 
a rational soul as our substantial form. As I outlined in section 3.1.2 above, the rejection 
of substance dualism‟s main claims allows hylomorphism to avoid its most obvious 
difficulties. In doing so it does not, however, abandon its solution to the problem of 
intransitivity. As Stump argues, the rational soul of a human being is quantifiably simple 
and at no time of its career will an individual be “less-ensouled” than at other times.316 As 
a result, by positing the existence of substantial forms, hylomorphism can provide a 
sound preservation of the transitivity of numerical identity. Therefore, in response to the 
perennial issue of intransitivity, I submit that hylomorphism is the most qualified position 
to handle the objection. 
 The substantial form of a human being is its primary principle of persistence, but 
importantly, it cannot be its principle of individuation. The main reason for this is that a 
form is something universal. It serves to delineate types or kinds of things but it cannot 
distinguish individuals under the same category, for the form will be the one thing that 
every member shares.
317
 The principle of individuation must then be the material 
component of the form/matter duality. But, as Oderberg notes, prime matter is not itself 
quantified until it is actualized by a substantial form, and as a result, it is not a legitimate 
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candidate either.
318
 Accordingly, Aquinas states that “what makes things individual is not 
material as such but demarcated material, by which I mean material thought as 
underlying certain defined dimensions.”319 But as the fire analogy indicates, Aquinas 
does not mean by this that the principle of individuation is a selection of matter with 
static dimensions. Substances, and more specifically, human beings, change their material 
parts over time, grow in size and shape, and extend in duration. As Oderberg and others 
have noted, the principle of individuation must then be “demarcated matter” (or as it is 
often translated, “designated matter”) understood as having “indeterminate quantity,” 
where quantity simply means the degree to which it is extended in three dimensions.
320
 In 
other words, it is not possible to individuate human beings over a certain duration based 
on a particular height or weight they have at any single moment. Though it is necessary 
that at each moment they do have determinate dimensions, most substances will not have 
those same determinate dimensions throughout their career.
321
 The range of possible 
dimensions for any given material object is dictated by its substantial form. Oderberg 
suggests that living things especially can only exhibit their characteristic features under 
certain ranges of dimensionality.
322
 
 The first relevant insight to gather from this analysis is the importance of the 
material component of a human being (understood dynamically) in tracing its 
individuation across time. While it is true that the sameness of substantial form allows us 
to re-identify a human being based on the continuation of its functional organization, the 
material component tells us that the object we are considering is not only of the same 
category, but that it is also numerically identical to the object whose previous stages we 
are comparing. The numerical identity of a substantial form, then, is traced by observing 
the spatio-temporal continuity of its material complement. As Haldane puts it, 
“Metaphysically speaking, what matters is material continuity, inasmuch as this is a 
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necessary complement to the preservation of one and the same individualized substantial 
form.”323 This is where at least some of the motivation for interpreting hylomorphism as 
animalism comes from. A human individual is unique with regard to non-human material 
objects in virtue of having a rational soul as its substantial form, but what makes it unique 
among other human beings is at least its distinct position in time and space.
324
 Even when 
in later sections of this thesis we approach an interpretation of hylomorphism that 
abandons the essentially-animalist stipulation, this spatio-temporal requirement will be a 
crucial element in its formulation. 
 The second topic of discussion that emerges from the issue of individuation, and 
the reason I include it in this section, is that, based on what has been said, hylomorphism 
risks falling into circularity. As has been argued, designated matter individuates 
substantial forms. What allows us to identify a substantial form as this substantial form is 
its location in time and space. But when observing a selection of smaller material entities, 
what we use to differentiate those candidates that are parts of a larger substance from 
those that lie outside of its boundaries are the qualities of the form itself and whether or 
not the smaller objects are caught up in its corresponding activities. It would seem, then, 
that the determination of matter requires a notion of form, but also, that form requires 
matter to be determined. If this is not a case of arguing in a circle it certainly comes close.  
 It may help to compare the present concern with the circularity problems faced by 
other accounts. Earlier I argued that formulations of PCT that are reliant on the 
experience-memories of individuals require the very concept of human individuation they 
are attempting to establish in order to validate the memories themselves.
325
 Animalism 
also faces the tough question of how to synchronically individuate lives without resorting 
to descriptions of the larger organisms.
326
 Similarly, hylomorphism faces the following 
problem: if a substantial form is the primary principle of persistence for a material object, 
what explains its persistence? What makes a substantial form exactly the same 
throughout the object‟s career? I have argued in this section that material continuity is 
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indicative of substantial identification. But if the persistence of a substantial form is 
constituted by the relations of its material counterparts, then the account is circular, and 
hylomorphism would appear to be no better off than its rivals. 
 The solution to this problem is one I briefly suggested back in the first chapter.
327
 
Though the persistence of material objects, and specifically human beings, is constituted 
chiefly by the continuity of a substantial form, the persistence of the substantial form 
itself must be a brute and unanalyzable fact.
328
 This does not, however, mean that there is 
nothing to be said about its persistence. For one, it is still true that a substantial form is 
individuated by designated matter. At the very first moment of its existence, a substantial 
form actualizes a selection of matter that has determinate dimensions in space and time. 
This allows Aquinas to say, “its [the rational soul‟s] individuality doesn‟t have to perish 
when the body is taken away, because the existence it has in its own right – an existence 
individuated by it being made the form of this body – from then on always stays 
individuated.”329 So in an important sense, designated matter is still the principle of 
individuation for substantial forms.  
 Moreover, spatio-temporal continuity remains an important tool for the re-
identification of substantial forms over time. In the case of living things, for instance, we 
can follow the instantiations of certain characteristic functions as they are individuated by 
an organism‟s dimensionality. When I claim that the dog sitting at the edge of my bed is 
identical to the dog that did the same yesterday, what makes this claim true is the fact that 
the dog has the same, numerically identical substantial form. But my own assertion of 
this fact is the result of a certain procedure. First, I can determine that this object in front 
of me is suitably arranged so as to exhibit the characteristic functions of a typical dog. 
This tells me that I am dealing with the same type of object. Secondly, I can, at least in 
principle, offer a detailed map of the spatio-temporal continuity between the dog that sat 
at the edge of my bed yesterday and the one that does so today, such that at each stage 
along the way it continues to have a configurational state appropriate for its kind. The 
fact that the dog of today has the same substantial form and is thus numerically identical 
                                                          
327
 p. 20 above.  
328
 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 117-120.  
329
 Aquinas, DEE, Ch. 5.  
 93 
to the dog of yesterday is a simple and unanalyzable truth, but spatio-temporal continuity 
is evidentially important for my own establishment of this claim. As Oderberg states, 
“We refer to evidence, and evidence is all we have to go on. Even the much-vaunted 
phenomenon of spatio-temporal continuity only gives us evidence rather than an 
analysis.”330 
 Oderberg‟s suggestion, then, is that hylomorphism can avoid the problems of 
circularity by emphasizing the brute fact of persistence. Although the evidence for 
establishing the persistence of a substantial form requires reference to the relations of its 
material counterparts, the persistence itself is not constituted by those relations, and thus 
there is no circularity in its analysis. It might be argued that brute identity is a solution 
that even a non-hylomorphic animalist could accept just as well. While I am willing to 
admit that this is a possibility,
331
 I would also argue that by positing the existence of a 
simple, immaterial part for each human individual, hylomorphic animalism is the most 
natural proponent of such a position. 
3.2.2 Substances, Rival Candidates, and Dead Bodies 
 Another important facet of Thomistic hylomorphism, and for our present 
purposes, HA, is Aquinas‟ so-called “unicity doctrine.”332 According to this doctrine, 
every material substance has only one substantial form. In the case of human beings, for 
instance, there is not a separate substantial form that first actualizes the body, another that 
actualizes the body as a living thing and a third that actualizes the living body‟s 
rationality. Instead, there is one single substantial form that actualizes all of a human 
being‟s functions and every one of its parts. This is a human being‟s rational soul. As St. 
Thomas puts it, “We must not think, therefore, of the soul and body as though the body 
had its own form making it a body, to which a soul is super-added, making it a living 
body; but rather that the body gets its being and its life from the soul.”333 And elsewhere 
he says,  
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we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides 
the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive 
and nutritive souls, so does it contain virtually all inferior forms, and itself 
alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things.
334
 
 Aquinas has two main reasons for espousing such a view,
335
 and I include them 
here not as a rigorous defence of his position, but as a means of further clarification. The 
first motivation for his position follows directly from his conception of prime matter. 
Recall that for Aquinas the material foundation of the natural world is completely 
unactualized. A substantial form is that which actualizes and organizes the purely 
potential prime matter into a certain type of thing. The result of this combination is a 
substance of a specific sort. Once matter is arranged into a substance, the only kind of 
form that can be added to it is an accidental form. This is due to the fact that a material 
substance receives its very being from a substantial form. Once it has being it does not 
require any further substantiation. It can take on other forms certainly, but it can only 
receive from them modifications or accidents of the being that it already has.
336
 
 Aquinas‟ second argument for the unicity of substantial forms is based on the 
apparent unity of the human individual. For Aquinas, there must be some explanation, 
some unifying principle for the coordination of the parts and functions of an organism. If 
an animal did not have a single substantial form, then, metaphysically speaking, it could 
not be considered a single entity in any robust sense:  
an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. 
For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has 
existence; because a thing has from the same source both existence and 
unity; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are 
not absolutely one.
337
 
But, Aquinas insists, a human being is absolutely one thing, and therefore each of us has 
only one substantial form. 
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 Aquinas‟ unicity doctrine has wide-reaching consequences for his greater 
hylomorphic ontology, and importantly, it also shapes his conception of human beings. 
Patrick Toner has recently argued that the entailments of the unicity doctrine can be used 
to solve many of the puzzles faced by proponents of a biological account of personal 
identity.
338
 In the following, I will attempt to outline and elaborate on his proposed 
solutions, utilizing relevant passages from the Thomistic literature when appropriate. 
 To begin with, let us start with the conclusion gathered from the above: a human 
being has as its formal component a single substantial form that actualizes all of its 
functions and every one of its parts. As a second premise, let us consider the fact that any 
substance gets its substantiality, indeed, its very being, from a substantial form. Based on 
these premises, we can conclude that, because it has within its composition only one 
substantial form, a human being has no other substances as proper parts.
339
 With that said, 
there is a right way and a wrong way to interpret this. The wrong way would be to 
conclude that each one of us is an immaterial soul or a philosophical atom with no parts 
whatsoever. The right way is to concede to the seemingly obvious fact that we do have 
parts, but insist that none of our parts are substances in themselves.
340
 
 But if our parts are not substances, what are they? Toner argues that many of the 
parts we do have are “mere spatial parts.” They can be “geometrically defined” and 
“picked out functionally on the basis of what the properties associated with those areas 
do.”341 In other words, my left hand is the left-most area of my body with which I am 
able to grasp and pull various things. For this reason, Brown also refers to them as 
“functional parts.”342 It is clear why something such as my hand cannot be a substance in 
itself. If disconnected from the larger organism, a hand can no longer engage in its 
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characteristic functions of grasping or pulling. And without its capacity for those 
functions, a hand loses its categorical status – it is no longer the same thing.343 
 Additionally, a human being also has “elemental parts.”344 These are parts that 
could otherwise be substances in themselves, but, when contained within an organism, 
are subsumed by the activities of the larger substance. For instance, a carbon atom is an 
elemental substance when detached from any larger entity, but when it becomes a part of 
an organism it undergoes a substantial change such that there is no longer anything 
configured by its carbon form.
345
 Instead, the substantial form of the organism 
reconfigures the prime matter of the former carbon atom so as to utilize its potentialities 
for its own good. As Haldane puts it,  
in hylomorphic terms there is in such a case only one actual substantial 
form, though there may be several virtual ones corresponding to lower 
level unifications. Activities which in lower-level systems would be 
attributable to the presence of different kinds of structuring principles are 
taken under the governance of the higher form.
346
 
The powers or properties of the former carbon atom can, however, continue to be 
localized in the organism. The continuation of their “qualitative features” is the reason 
why Toner insists that these types of parts do in fact exist. He states that, although they 
cannot be considered substances in their own right, they are still “nominally present.”347 
But, “the important question,” Toner continues, “is not whether the spatial parts bear a 
resemblance to the substances that existed prior to composition: they usually will. The 
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important question, rather, is what owns the properties.”348 Toner‟s assertion is that every 
property or causal power exhibited by a spatial or elemental part must be attributed to the 
substance itself.
349
 
 With these details having been laid out, we are now in a position to formulate a 
hylomorphic response to one of the biggest problems for animalism. As I noted in section 
2.1.2 above, OA relies heavily on the thinking animal argument: if I am the thinker of my 
thoughts, and the animal in my chair thinks my thoughts, then to avoid too many thinkers, 
I must be the animal in my chair. But Zimmerman asks, why suppose that the animal is 
the only candidate for the thinker of my thoughts? One could easily replace „the animal‟ 
in the argument with things such as „my head,‟ „my brain,‟ „a mere hunk of matter,‟ or 
„my body‟ and use it as an argument for being one of those things. This is the so-called 
“Problem of Rival Candidates.” Olson‟s less than enthusiastic response to this objection 
is to deny that any of the supposed replacements exist. But as he himself notes, it is not a 
response that he likes to have to give. 
 Toner‟s reply is that, based on our analysis of substance above, an advocate of 
HA can properly respond to the rival candidates objection without having to adopt the 
sparse ontology. His argument can be summarized as follows: 
1. A human being is a substance. 
2. A substance has no other substances as parts. 
3. I am a substance. 
4. Therefore, I cannot be a part of a human being.350 
As we did with Olson‟s original argument, let us briefly examine Toner‟s 
premises. The first premise may appear contentious due to the fact that we have not yet 
precisely determined what a substance is or what things qualify as substances. 
Unfortunately, I do not have room here to give a full analysis of Toner‟s account of 
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substance,
 351
 but perhaps it is sufficient enough to note that, historically, human beings 
have been seen as the quintessential member of the substance category; even the sparse 
ontologies of Olson, van Inwagen, and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz admit that organisms 
are substances.
352
 The second premise has been the topic of discussion for this section, 
and it is the main contribution of HA. The third premise, as I will admit, may be the most 
difficult to defend in front of a larger philosophical audience.
353
 I think some PCT 
theorists are quite willing to argue that we are not substances of any sort.
354
 But 
according to the hylomorphic framework, a substance is, in its most basic sense, an entity 
to which accidents or properties can be attributed.
355
 If, as seems to be the case, I am 
some thing to which properties are attributable rather than being any property itself, then 
it follows quite naturally that I am a substance of some sort. Moreover, as a suggestion 
for animalists, the third premise would seem to hold considerable weight. Van Inwagen 
states quite frankly, “I myself believe that we are material substances,”356 and one of 
Olson‟s subsidiary arguments against PCT is claiming that unlike „animal,‟ the term 
„person‟ is not a substance concept.357  
 As I mentioned earlier,
358
 HA also preserves the thinking element of Olson‟s 
original argument for animalism. For we can understand thinking as either a power of 
some entity or an attributable property along the lines of: „is currently thinking.‟ But if 
Toner is right in suggesting that only substances can have powers or properties attributed 
to them, then any thinking seemingly done by a part of an organism is actually the 
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property or activity of the larger substance, though it may be localized in one of its spatial 
parts. For instance, though thought may be manifested more readily in the brain or the 
head of a human being, because none of these “candidates” are substances, it is ultimately 
the human being herself that is doing the thinking. 
 HA has the resources, then, to provide two interrelated responses to the problem 
of rival candidates. First, it says that none of the parts of a human being are substances. 
Inasmuch as any of the rival candidates are parts of human beings, they are thereby 
eliminated from candidacy for being me; they just are not the right type of thing. 
Secondly, by denying substancehood to any part of a human being, these parts are also 
eliminated from candidacy for being the thinker of one‟s thoughts; they simply cannot 
have that power or property attributed to them. Importantly, HA is able to do all this 
without having to deny the existence of those objects. Toner is quite adamant about this 
point: “it is no part of my view of substance to claim that only substances exist...I‟m not 
saying that the carbon atoms in you don‟t exist (just that they‟re not substances). This is 
not a form of eliminativism.”359 And elsewhere he says, “My view is not committed to 
the claim that there are no brains or livers or cells or hands: it is committed only to 
denying that those things are substances.”360 So I can say that I do have hands, feet, a 
head, cells, and constituent carbon atoms, but these must be understood as either 
functional or elemental parts and not substances. If we allow this suggestion, then HA 
offers a powerful reply to the rival-candidates objection, that, by avoiding eliminativism, 
is a considerable improvement upon that given by OA. 
 In addition to solving the problem of rival candidates, Toner argues that the 
entailments of Aquinas‟ unicity doctrine can also be used to mitigate animalism‟s 
“Corpse Problem.”361 Recall from section 2.2.1 above that the dead body that is left after 
the death of an organism needs to be accounted for: either it is the same body that existed 
prior to the organism‟s death (and was thus coincident with the animal) or some new 
entity has “popped” into existence. Promulgators of the corpse problem insist that neither 
of these options is very appealing. Van Inwagen‟s solution is to deny that there is any 
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material composite after the death of an organism; there are only material simples 
arranged in an accidental order. It would be preferable, Olson and Hershenov admit, if the 
animalist did not have to resort to this eliminativist strategy. And in an attempt to offer 
their own replies, they have emphasized the radical dissimilarity between the organism 
and the corpse. This, I suggested, is an important first step in solving the problem, but in 
order to give a full account of corpses, the animalist should look to the resources of 
hylomorphism. In what follows I will demonstrate how HA resolves the puzzle of dead 
bodies. 
 What we learn from the unicity doctrine is that all of the parts of a substance get 
their identity, indeed their very being, from the single substantial form of the substance 
itself. Consequently, any part that is removed from the substance and is thus no longer 
directed by its substantial form, is, an entirely new entity, if it should gain its own 
existence. For according to hylomorphism, there is no actual part that is first subsumed 
by the form of a substance and then gains its own substantial form. Instead, a selection of 
prime matter, understood as potentially any substance, has undergone a “substantial 
change,”362 for no actual entity can survive the loss of its substantial form.363 
 Let us assume, then, that if there is such a thing as „the body‟ and it is not 
identical to the human being itself, it would have to be a part of the human being. Notice 
that based on what we concluded above, the coincidence of the body and the animal is no 
problem for hylomorphism. The body will not qualify as a substance as long as it is a part 
of the human being, and thus it will not be a thinker. But what must also be the case is 
that the body cannot survive the loss of a human being‟s substantial form. Now, 
according to HA, the substantial form of a human being - its rational soul - is, in virtue of 
being a soul, the principle of a human being‟s life. So once the event of a human life 
ceases, this signals the departure of its substantial form. Therefore, even if there is such a 
thing as „the body,‟ it will not persist beyond the death of the organism, and the purported 
symmetry in the corpse problem is simply not there. As Toner puts it, “[D]eath is a 
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substantial change...When the animal dies, whatever is left over is not the same thing that 
was there before. This answer to the corpse problem simply falls out of hylemorphic 
animalism. It‟s not a bullet we have to bite.”364 
 An interesting question for the hylomorphist is, once we have granted that death is 
a substantial change, and that no actual part of the human being has survived, what is 
left? What can we say about the remains of the (formerly) living? Brown remarks that 
although Aquinas himself never explicitly answers this question, the hylomorphist has 
two options: either the matter formerly configured by a rational soul takes on a new 
substantial form, the form of a corpse, or a deceased human being immediately breaks 
down into smaller elemental substances.
365
 Contemporary hylomorphists seem to be split 
on this issue.
366
 While it may not be essential for HA to choose one option over the other, 
I think there is room for an intermediate position. It certainly appears that a corpse is, for 
a while at least, a single something. It may very well be a substance. Admittedly, its 
substantial form would be of a peculiar type. Instead of ensuring the unity and activity of 
the substance it would provide for disunitive functions and passivity. But after a certain 
length of time, the corpse will inevitably break down into elemental substances as a result 
of its characteristic operation of putrefaction. 
 In summary, HA avoids the supposed dead body dilemma by rejecting both 
options. First, by including an account of substantial change, an advocate of HA can deny 
that the dead body need be accounted for prior to the organism‟s death; simply put, it just 
was not there. Even if there were such a thing as the organism‟s body, and it was 
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coincident with the animal, the entailments of the unicity doctrine allow HA to side-step 
the problem of too many thinkers. But barring that admittance, the hylomorphist can 
undermine the corpse problem by claiming that death does in fact introduce a new 
substance (or substances) in place of the organism. Second, though a corpse (or aggregate 
of elemental substances) emerges from the remains of a living thing, this does not entail 
that it “pops” into existence. Recall that for hylomorphism the underlying subject of 
substantial change is prime matter. Prime matter is not actually anything, but its 
potentiality to take on various substantial forms serves as an explanation for what takes 
place during the death of a human being. If by „pops into existence‟ the advancers of the 
objection imply that the corpse‟s emergence is completely unexplained, then HA rejects 
this suggestion as well. Importantly, neither of these solutions is available for OA. The 
only option appears to be van Inwagen‟s eliminativism. One of the most salient virtues of 
HA is that it is not required to take the eliminativist route, and the supposed dilemma of 
dead bodies is just another opportunity for hylomorphism to demonstrate its 
resourcefulness. 
 Thus far I have argued that hylomorphism, interpreted as hylomorphic animalism, 
can properly respond to many of the problems faced by other views including: 
intransitivity, circularity, rival candidates and dead bodies. I have also argued that it can 
do so without falling into the questionable position of substance dualism or resorting to 
mereological nihilism. But since the first chapter I have not given adequate weight to the 
so-called “transplant intuition” almost universally accepted by PCT theorists. In the 
remaining sections of this chapter I will explore an alternative interpretation of 
hylomorphism, one which grants more plausibility to the possibility of preserving one‟s 
identity via cerebrum transplants. 
3.3 Contingently Animalist Hylomorphism 
 Although Aquinas himself remarks that we are essentially animals,
367
 David 
Hershenov has recently argued, based on other claims that Aquinas makes, that he should 
not have held that position and modern hylomorphists should not follow him in that 
                                                          
367
 See p. 108 above.  
 103 
regard.
368
 Instead, Hershenov says that we should understand ourselves as being 
contingently animals. What he means by this is that „human animal‟ should not be 
construed as our “substance sortal” (that which picks out the kind of thing we most 
fundamentally are), but rather as a “phase sortal,” or a category of which we are members 
only for a certain duration of our existence, the membership being an inessential property 
of that which we are.
369
 In other words, the term „animal‟ should be attributed to us in the 
same way „adolescent‟ or „teacher‟ or „husband‟ is. It is true that at one time I was 
identical to a child and at another time I was identical to an adolescent, but I have since 
left those categories, even though I am still the same human being. Hershenov argues that 
we can likewise survive a loss of our „animality.‟ As a way of differentiating this stream 
of hylomorphic thought from the hylomorphic animalism examined above, let us refer to 
Hershenov‟s and other Hershenov-type positions as Contingently Animalist 
Hylomorphism, or CAH.  
 As Hershenov explains, his position is a form of animalism in the sense that it 
preserves Olson‟s thinking animal argument.370 When the animal thinks, it is not the case 
that a person or a proper part of the organism also thinks. There are not two thinkers for 
every one of my thoughts. Rather, I am the only thing that presently thinks my thoughts, 
and I do this qua animal. But what the contingency stipulation allows us to do is to 
survive in some dramatic cases without having to do so as that same or any animal. For 
instance, Hershenov argues that advocates of CAH can (and should) hold that we would 
survive a cerebrum transplant as the transported cerebrum rather than the animal that is 
left behind.
371
 Thus, Hershenov views CAH as a “hybrid view that offers a way to capture 
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the belief that we are animals and yet that we are to be found wherever our transplanted 
brain is functioning.”372 In the following, I will attempt to elaborate on Hershenov‟s 
interpretation of hylomorphism by outlining its motivations, analyzing its applications, 
and demonstrating how, even with its acceptance of the transplant intuition, CAH is not 
as easily undermined by the difficulties that confronted PCT theorists in chapter one. 
3.3.1 A Hylomorphic Account of Cerebrum Transplantation  
According to any hylomorphic account of personal identity, each of us must be 
identical to a composite of form and matter. Following in this tradition, Hershenov insists 
that a human individual is “a single substance, a thinking, living creature resulting from a 
soul configuring matter.”373 He also emphasizes a few of the traditional hylomorphic 
assertions I made earlier: namely, that a human individual is neither composed of two 
distinct substances nor is she identical to only her soul.
374
 But what he also stresses is the 
fact that the substantial forms of human beings, their rational souls, are remarkably 
different from the forms of inanimate objects and the souls of non-human organisms. As 
noted above,
375
 a particular feature of Thomistic hylomorphism is its pronouncement that 
the rational soul of a human being must itself be immaterial due to its ability to grant 
cognitive and self-reflective capabilities. It is these rational capacities that distinguish 
human beings from other animals and allow religiously-minded hylomorphists to say that 
we are “made in God‟s image.”376 So if our persistence conditions turn out to be 
strikingly different from those of other animals, Hershenov says, this should not be too 
surprising.
377
 And because an individual‟s capacities for rationality and freedom of the 
will are the very things that make him a distinctly human creature, “[i]f those capacities 
have gone with the cerebrum then there is reason to think that the person has moved.”378 
 Based on these points, Hershenov gives the following hylomorphic interpretation 
of cerebrum transplantation: First, the rational soul configures the body so as to make it 
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the sort of thing capable of being rational. Prior to any kind of transplantation this is the 
animal. But in the case of a brain transfer, the very seat of the physical manifestation of a 
human being‟s rational capacity is moved, taking with it the individual‟s rational soul. 
Hershenov explains: 
The person‟s soul will configure less matter during the transplant 
procedure than it did before the cerebrum was removed, and then will 
configure more and different matter after the cerebrum has been 
„replanted.‟ In the interim period, the time which the cerebrum has been 
removed from one skull but not yet put in another, the person becomes 
physically very small, just cerebrum-size. One could say the person‟s 
arms, legs, trunk, lower brain, face and skull have been amputated. Instead 
of configuring the body of an organism, the rational soul configures 
merely the matter of the cerebrum.
379
 
Hershenov‟s interpretation of cerebrum relocation as a case of amputation rather 
than transplantation is inspired by the work of neuroscientist D. Alan Shewmon. In his 
1985 article, “The Metaphysics of Brain Death, Persistent Vegetative State, and 
Dementia,” Shewmon introduces various thought experiments in an attempt to answer the 
following question: “what is the minimum part of the human body still capable of 
supporting the human essence?”380 Backed by the empirical foundations of his area of 
research, Shewmon provides a scientific case for the possibility of preserving one‟s 
consciousness in the cerebrum, even after the human being‟s limbs, organs, torso, skull, 
and brain stem have been removed.
381
 While it is certainly a matter of debate whether or 
not his scientific conclusions remain valid today, the important philosophical contribution 
of Shewmon‟s work is his rephrasing of the traditional brain transplant thought 
experiments in terms of amputations. 
If one‟s identity can be preserved by saving just the cerebrum, then according to 
CAH, in a transplant case, the rest of the animal could be left on the operating table while 
the individual herself is transported across the room. Indeed, it seems one could leave a 
living, biologically human animal behind as long as its brain stem is left intact and 
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functioning seemingly without interruption.
382
 But if, as Hershenov himself claims, the 
removed cerebrum is configured by one‟s rational soul as its substantial form, then the 
human organism left behind cannot also be configured by that same substantial form. If it 
is in fact a living human organism on the operating table, then it is an entirely new entity 
from what was there before, configured by its own substantial form. The removal of a 
functioning cerebrum, then, would constitute a substantial change. Likewise, if one‟s 
cerebrum is successfully transplanted into another cerebrumless (but still living), 
biologically human organism, then that organism‟s substantial form will be usurped by 
the formal influence of one‟s own rational soul, thus completing another substantial 
change. This process of swapping animals in and out of existence is one of the main 
reasons Olson finds CAH implausible.
383
 I would agree that it is a concern for the view 
(as even Hershenov admits
384
), but before addressing this and other problems for CAH, I 
would like to make a few more points of clarification. 
One of the more important facets of CAH I want to emphasize is that it is not 
necessarily committed to the “actualism” of some forms of PCT. In other words, it need 
not be the overt psychological characteristics of a human individual that trace her 
persistence over time, but rather, the underlying capacities for realizing certain levels of 
cognition and self-reflection, which are in turn ensured by the continuation of one‟s 
substantial form.
385
 For this reason, CAH theorists D. Alan Shewmon and Mark Spencer 
have argued that cases of cerebrum transplantation must be understood as importantly 
different from real-world instances of dementia, reversible comas, and even persistent 
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vegetative states.
386
 In the former cases, the capacity for rationality is physically removed 
and one‟s identity can be traced by following the spatio-temporally continuous path of the 
cerebrum itself. But in the latter situations, one may describe a patient‟s psychological 
capacities as being „thwarted‟ by her condition rather than being removed.387 In that case, 
the rational soul would remain with the body. 
To see why this may be so, consider two important features of the rational soul as 
substantial form that Spencer brings to light:  
First, (1) the soul is first and foremost the form of a body; in its natural 
condition it informs a body, and it will naturally tend to inform a body 
until material conditions deteriorate to the point where it simply can no 
longer do so. Second, (2) the human soul is a rational soul and so will 
implement these powers in relation to matter as long as possible. However, 
if the implementation of its rational capacities is not possible, the same 
soul will continue to implement its lower powers rather than separate 
entirely from matter and take on a separated existence in which it can only 
implement some powers unnaturally without matter.
388
 
The key to understanding Spencer‟s assertion (that the rational soul will remain with the 
body even after a loss of overt psychological activity) is Aquinas‟ unicity doctrine, 
mentioned above. Recall that for Aquinas, there is not a separate substantial form that 
actualizes a human being‟s biological life, but rather, this activity is placed under the 
dominion of the individual‟s rational soul. So if the biological unity of the human being is 
retained, and its rational capacities have not been physically removed (as they would be 
in the case of cerebrum transplantation), then the same substantial form will continue to 
serve as a principle of biological unity, and one‟s identity will be preserved. In a related 
scenario, Shewmon remarks, “the personal identity of a brainless body probably depends 
critically on the manner in which it loses the brain, i.e., whether the brain is physically 
removed from it intact or is destroyed in situ.”389, 390 
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 CAH, then, is capable of providing some insightful and explanatory resources for 
an account of cerebrum transplantation. But in an attempt to bridge the gap between 
animalism and PCT, it seems to reintroduce some of the problems having to do with the 
latter, while at the same time arousing its own unique concerns. Shewmon‟s and 
Spencer‟s formulations have, for instance, been criticized as violating the intrinsic 
requirement of identity in the same way closest continuer views do. In the next section, I 
will attempt to alleviate some of these worries before turning to a general evaluation of 
the two hylomorphic views explored in this chapter. 
3.3.2 Problems Old and New 
 As I mentioned above, both Toner and Olson criticize CAH for its assertion that 
animals can “pop” in and out of existence simply by moving around a functioning 
cerebrum. Recall that according to CAH, a new animal comes into existence when a 
functioning cerebrum is removed from the body and also a cerebrumless, albeit living, 
human organism goes out of existence when a functioning cerebrum is successfully 
added to it. But Olson says, “This is all perfectly absurd. At any rate, if we think about 
the persistence of human animals and other intelligent organisms in this way, we shall 
depart significantly from the concept of a living organism that today‟s life sciences 
operate with.”391 For in both cases there seems to be no interruption in the life-sustaining 
or metabolic activities of the organism during the procedure.
392
 How, then, can we say 
that anything has died? 
 A “popping-into-existence” objection would be a strange one coming from 
Toner.
393
 As we have already seen, Toner accepts that at the cessation of life processes, a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“[w]hat is left behind is a mindless animal that doesn‟t have the capacity for thought and action” (“A 
Hylomorphic Account,” 492). Shewmon on the other hand argues that the capacity is there in virtue of it 
being biologically human, and thus it is informed by a rational soul (Shewmon, “Recovery from „Brain 
Death,‟” 73). He points out that there is an important difference between the question of personal identity 
(which entity is identical to the prior human being) and what he calls “somatic enumeration” (how many 
rational animals are present in the thought experiment) (Ibid., 70). Because my thesis is one about personal 
identity, deciding on the issue of somatic enumeration is not essential to my arguments.   
391
 Olson, The Human Animal, 119.  
392
 Ibid., 117.  
393
 To be fair, Toner doesn‟t explicitly make this claim. He only asserts that it would be strange if human 
animals had different persistence conditions than other animals (“On Hylemorphism and Personal 
Identity”). The point I am trying to make is that he shouldn‟t put to much weight on this assertion, given 
other things he says.  
 109 
human body no longer exists (even though there appears to be some persistent material 
object), and that a corpse takes its place. Toner‟s account avoids a similar objection of 
unexplained-existence by utilizing notions of substantial change and the underlying 
subject of that change, prime matter. As I will explain more fully below, I think an 
advocate of CAH can offer a similar explanation of the cerebrum transplant.
394
 If the 
language of substantial change can mitigate the corpse problem, perhaps it can do the 
same here. 
 As Hershenov notes, the CAH theorist can also present a similar tu quoque to 
Olson.
395
 Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that a detached cerebrum can in fact 
engage in the psychological activities necessary for personhood in the Lockean sense. But 
according to OA, I am essentially an animal. So even if my cerebrum is removed and it is 
in some sense a person, it is not an animal and thus it cannot be me. In this case a new 
“person” has popped into existence just by removing one‟s cerebrum. Moreover, this 
“cerebrum-person” will cease to exist once it is successfully „replanted‟ in another living 
animal. This is due to the fact that Olson interprets cerebrum transplants as having no 
more ontological significance for the organism than liver or kidney transplants.
396
 In 
response, then, to Olson‟s objection, the CAH theorist could reply that he too is 
committed to having entities pop in and out of existence.
397
 
 The CAH theorist can also point out that, even within the biological sphere, there 
are cases in which an organism can cease to exist without dying in the traditional sense. 
Consider the example of amoebic division. When an amoeba divides, the most common 
biological interpretation is that it ceases to exist and spawns two offshoots, neither of 
which are identical to the original.
398
 But there is no amoeba-corpse or dead body left 
behind. It also seems like there is no interruption in the amoeba‟s life processes. If one 
observes the career of the pre-fission amoeba and then focuses on either of the offshoots 
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after fission, it may appear as if there is an unbroken continuum of biological life. Olson 
himself admits this exception: “when an amoeba divides, nothing happens that looks 
much like death. Nothing begins to decay, and no corpse results. So we know that an 
organism can cease to exist without interruption of its vital functions and without leaving 
behind any lifeless remains.”399 
 Neither of the types of substantial change that CAH includes in its account of 
cerebrum transplantation will be exactly like amoebic division, but this exception 
importantly opens the door for some cases that do apply. For instance, consider some 
examples offered by Shewmon: 
Many plants and certain lower animals, such as starfish and planaria, have 
the capacity for severed parts to grow into new complete organisms. Here 
we observe the multiplication of living substantial forms through the mere 
physical separation of parts, as opposed to the ordinary route of natural 
reproduction. The severed part loses its participation in the original 
organism‟s substantial form, but instead of decaying, it has enough 
functional unity of its own to stay alive and to develop into a whole 
organism again. The functional unity indicates that a new substantial form 
was actualized at the moment of separation of the part.
400
 
If we interpret cerebrum transplantation as a physical separation of the animal from the 
human individual rather than a removal of the cerebrum from the animal, then perhaps we 
can understand the process as being similar to that described here by Shewmon. In a 
human case, the individual would split, with the cerebrum carrying the identity of the 
original person and a new, living, biologically human organism coming into its own 
existence, configured by a new substantial form.
401
 While this process is admittedly 
strange and perhaps even counter-intuitive, it is both possible and with some biological 
precedence. Its peculiarity, I would argue, is due largely to the fantastic nature of 
cerebrum transplant thought experiments to begin with. 
 If the first substantial change in CAH‟s account of cerebrum transplantation is to 
be understood as a kind of “regeneration,” then perhaps the second should be viewed as a 
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type of “grafting.” When a functioning cerebrum is placed into a cerebrumless, 
biologically human organism, we would have to say that the rational soul of the former 
subsumes the very existence of the latter; there is now a numerically different human 
body from what was there before. But where has the original human organism gone? Has 
it died? Based on exceptions that even Olson recognizes, we could say that the original 
organism has died without having to produce a corpse or demonstrate a discontinuity in 
its life processes. But I think Toner‟s analysis of substantial parts helps the most here. 
Instead of the original animal ceasing to exist entirely, its powers and properties are 
“absorbed” by the substance introduced by one‟s rational soul, which may in turn allow it 
to enjoy a “nominal” or “virtual” presence within the larger entity. Once again, the 
description of cerebrum transplantation that the advocate of CAH will have to give is 
almost strikingly bizarre, but I hope to have shown that such an account is at least 
minimally coherent. 
 A greater problem for CAH, I think, is the problem of psychological fission that 
plagues many formulations of PCT. Earlier I argued that the intuitive pull of Shoemaker‟s 
Brown/Brownson scenario can be undermined by bringing in the possibility of double-
transplants.
402
 If transplanting even half of Brown‟s brain into Robinson‟s body preserves 
enough of the relevant psychology to warrant the conclusion that Brownson just is 
Brown, then it seems we can do the same with the other half of Brown‟s brain and have 
just as much reason to call Brownsmith Brown. But as quickly became evident, they 
cannot both be Brown. So logically, the existence of an equal candidate would have to 
eliminate the other from candidacy. However, if an assertion of personal persistence 
depends on facts outside of the relations held between Brownsmith or Brownson and the 
original Brown, then this will not only violate the intrinsic identity requirement defended 
by Wiggins and others, but it will also lead to a myriad of epistemological issues such as 
the ones I outlined above. Consequently, the problem of fission is a serious difficulty for 
accounts of personal identity that rely on psychological or even brain criteria, and it is not 
immediately apparent how CAH is immune to this objection. If this worry cannot be 
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resolved by the account, then CAH may only have a slight edge over the PCT views I 
dismissed by the end of chapter one.
403
 
 As I noted earlier, the distinct location of a human being‟s substantial form in 
time and space carries with it a necessity for spatio-temporal continuity between two 
stages of an individual‟s career.404 A CAH theorist, therefore, should reject the possibility 
of identification across psychological “jumps” such as brain-state transfers or 
teletransportation.
405
 As a result, psychological reduplication should not be a problem for 
CAH. But even if it insists on spatio-temporal continuity in order to avoid reduplication, 
this alone will not allow CAH to avoid the related problem of fission. For each cerebral 
hemisphere would be spatio-temporally continuous with the original animal, and that is 
why it is such a pesky problem. 
 Advocates of CAH are markedly brief concerning the problem of fission. 
Hershenov‟s only comment is that “a double transplant would create new minds and 
persons. This is because there would be two living bodies and the hylomorphic soul 
configures only a single human body.”406 Spencer also says that the soul is “unable to be 
divided or duplicated among many material substrates.”407 While it is true that the 
relation of form to a selection of matter is usually one-to-one, this does not by itself offer 
much in the way of analysis. Shewmon notes that “even though the human soul has a 
spiritual dimension, it [also] constitutes the principle of physical unity and immanent 
dynamism of the body. To assert that one and the same principle of somatic unity was 
informing two physically discrete and independent unities makes little sense.”408 Here we 
have an interesting suggestion that within the very conception of substantial form is a no-
splitting clause. Any two parts configured by a single substantial form would have to be 
rigidly united, or as St. Thomas puts it, they would have to compose something that was 
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“absolutely one.” Complete physical separation would seem to be at least minimally 
sufficient for two parts not being one thing absolutely. Unlike Shoemaker‟s similar “no-
branching” clause, this hylomorphic no-splitting stipulation appears to be an integral part 
of its formulation. As Toner might say, “it isn‟t a bullet we have to bite.” 
 With these suggestions in mind, we can formulate an account of fission for CAH 
with at least some level of detail. I think an advocate of CAH should say, not that the 
original rational soul ends its existence as a configurer when both of the two cerebral 
hemispheres are successfully planted, but when the very act of splitting the cerebrum is 
performed outside of the skull of the original animal. The cerebrum-split should then be 
understood as similar to amoebic division, in that the human individual composed of a 
selection of cerebral matter and his rational soul ceases to exist and spawns two 
offshoots. One could, I suppose, insist that the split is more like the starfish whose lost 
appendage grows into its own organism while the original starfish persists. This would be 
a hylomorphic equivalent of the closest-continuer view. But for reasons I will reiterate 
below, CAH should try to avoid that route if possible. It should instead hold that 
cerebrum division results in the death of the original human individual. 
 CAH, then, can offer an analysis of fission that seems less ad hoc than that offered 
by Shoemaker. But it will only truly be successful if it can also solve the epistemological 
problems associated with that account. For example, consider a scenario in which one 
comes to know that a certain human being (call him Brownson) exhibits many of the 
beliefs, memories, desires and intentions of a previously-existing human being, Brown, as 
a result of a brain transplant. But what we also find out is that this gentleman has only 
one of Brown‟s original cerebral hemispheres. For Shoemaker, in order to establish that 
Brownson is identical to Brown we would have to know whether or not the transplant of 
the second hemisphere was successful, even if but for a moment. For if at the time of 
transplantation there were two equal candidates, then this would eliminate both from 
candidacy. But as I have argued above,
409
 determining the non-existence of rivals would 
be a very difficult, if not impossible, task. 
 According to my interpretation of CAH, the success of Brown‟s second transplant 
is completely irrelevant in determining the identity of Brownson. If we can determine that 
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Brownson‟s “Brownian” cerebral hemisphere is a result of division mid-transplant, then 
this is enough to establish that Brownson is not Brown. During the very act of splitting 
his cerebrum, Brown‟s original substantial form departed from his matter and Brown 
himself ceased to exist. I think this solution would also preserve Wiggins‟ “Only a and b” 
rule.
410
 Recall that according to this condition, whether a certain entity „b‟ is identical to 
an earlier entity „a‟ should depend solely on the relations between „a‟ and „b‟ rather than 
the relations „a‟ may have to some entity „c.‟ In the present case, the identification of 
Brown and Brownson is dependent on whether or not Brownson is carrying an entire 
cerebrum or just a single hemisphere. If he is only carrying a single hemisphere of 
Brown‟s original brain,411 then this hemisphere‟s history of separation from its other half 
is a genuine event in its history. We are not required to give an account of the other half 
in order to determine its status. 
 There are two further clarifications to be made in order to solidify this account. 
First, if one‟s cerebrum were to be split while still a proper part of the original organism, 
this would not suffice for fission. Hershenov, for instance, insists that even if severing the 
corpus callosum of a „planted‟ brain resulted in an apparent psychological disunity 
between the two cerebral hemispheres, this would not be a problem for CAH: 
While hylomorphism is committed to our having rational capacities, it is 
not committed to our thought being unified. It is the human being that is 
the thinking subject, not a soul whose contents must be fully accessible 
and unified. So split brains and mental states cut off from each other don‟t 
entail the impossibility of a split hylomorphic soul, and don‟t give the 
hylomorphic thinker any reason to abandon his soul theory.
412
 
Secondly, there may be some rare cases in which a single hemisphere transplant is 
sufficient for the preservation of one‟s identity. For example, consider a case in which a 
stroke victim irretrievably loses functionality in large sections of his brain. It might then 
be plausible to assume that after this terrible event, the physical manifestation of his 
capacity for rationality is located in only one of the cerebral hemispheres. Perhaps in this 
case, taking that cerebral hemisphere and placing it elsewhere would preserve the 
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patient‟s identity. Though I think Shewmon and Spencer are less likely than Hershenov to 
accept this suggestion, it may be something for the CAH theorist to consider. 
 As a related objection to CAH, some have accused Shewmon‟s and Spencer‟s 
formulations of collapsing into a closest-continuer view, and thus violating the intrinsic 
requirement for identity.
413
 For it seems, according to these accounts, that one‟s identity 
can be preserved in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) only if there is not a better 
candidate with one‟s functioning cerebrum elsewhere. But as Spencer argues, 
hylomorphism has the resources to overcome this objection. He explains that the soul is 
the “guarantor of personal identity,” and that “the disembodied brain in the thought 
experiment is not just the best candidate for the person or the closest continuer of his 
psychology – rather, it really is the person because the brain is informed by the same soul 
by which the original whole person was informed.”414 Once the cerebrum is removed, so 
goes the person, and even if that cerebrum is ultimately unsuccessful in its transplant, the 
animal left behind cannot “regain” the individual‟s identity. As Spencer continues, “The 
presence of the soul in the brain or in the body is only dependent on where it can best 
implement its powers at the moment of separation, not on what is occurring elsewhere 
than the place where it is.”415 
 Although he insists that his formulation of CAH is not susceptible to a closest-
continuer objection in its analysis, Spencer admits that his view may have 
epistemological problems.
416
 If Shewmon is correct in saying that serious cases of 
cerebral collapse are “as though some macabre neurosurgeon had opened up the skull, 
removed the entire brain, and deposited it down the garbage disposal,” then it seems we 
could have a problem determining whether a patient‟s cerebrum was physically removed 
or if it disintegrated through natural means.
417
 But I am not so sure that Spencer needs to 
concede much weight to this concern. I think Shewmon is sensationalizing here, and it 
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seems there would have to be some observable difference between the skull of a patient in 
which the cerebrum deteriorated gradually and one in which an operation was carried out 
in order to physically remove the cerebrum intact.
418
 Certainly for the external observer, a 
cerebrum transplant would not appear to interrupt the life processes of the individual, and 
it might be hard for that person to tell the difference, but this is just a complication of the 
thought experiment, and not a real philosophical concern. 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have set out to accomplish three things. First, I wanted to outline 
a clear and workable explication of a general hylomorphic ontology in order to elicit the 
aspects relevant for an account of personal identity. In its simplest formulation, 
hylomorphism is a theory that posits form and matter as the two fundamental components 
of every material object. But as I have argued, the notions of „form‟ and „matter‟, when at 
work in a conception of human beings are riddled with complexities, and though I cannot 
hope to have explored all of them here, what I have included should be sufficient to 
support the rest of my arguments. 
 My second task was to present an animalist interpretation of hylomorphism and 
demonstrate how it can both capture the insights of standard animalism, and, with the 
help of its larger metaphysical framework, respond to its concerns. I have not given 
complete defenses of many of the Thomistic doctrines, such as the simplicity of the soul 
or the unicity of substantial forms, but what I do hope to have shown is the 
resourcefulness of these suppositions in the personal identity debate once their 
plausibility has been granted. If problems such as intransitivity, circularity, rival 
candidates and dead bodies warrant the serious consideration I have given them here, my 
conclusion is that the animalist may have compelling reasons to switch his support to 
hylomorphic animalism. This is essentially my response to the problems examined in 
chapter two. 
 In the remaining sections of chapter three I chose to return to the motivations and 
concerns that were introduced by psychological continuity accounts in chapter one. If the 
so-called “transplant intuition” has the intuitive appeal that many PCT theorists think it 
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does, then in order to solve the problems associated with these ever-popular thought 
experiments, we should seriously consider a departure into what I have referred to as 
contingently animalist hylomorphism. Though its solutions were convoluted and at times 
bizarre, I think this properly displays the price that must be paid in order to defend 
anything like psychological continuity. 
 The overarching goal of my thesis, then, has been to defend a twofold conclusion: 
If a personal identity theorist wishes to give a certain amount of weight to the transplant 
scenario, then she should subscribe to CAH. If, however, she finds the problems 
pertaining to transplantation too much to overcome, and is convinced by animalism’s 
critique of PCT, then she should subscribe to HA. Either way, hylomorphism wins.    
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